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INTRODUCTION

The generation of electricity from small scale renewable energy
resources' and cogeneration 2 has come to play a central role in
t Neil Hamilton holds the Trustees' Chair in Administrative Law at William
Mitchell College of Law and is Co-Director of the Applied Research Center. He received
his B.A. degree from Colorado College in 1967, his J.D. degree from the University of
Minnesota in 1970, and his M.A. degree from the University of Michigan in 1979. This
Article benefited greatly from the assistance of my research assistants Steven E. Rau and
Carol L. Bros.
1. Small power producers include small facilities which employ renewable resources
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national energy policies.3 Three developments prompted increased interest in alternative energy forms. First, the Arab oil embargo of the early 1970's brought consumers face to face with
skyrocketing utility rates attributed, in part, to the nearly fourfold
increase in the price of oil. Approximately forty percent of all en-4
ergy consumed in the United States is used to generate electricity.
Consequently, the inflationary economic cycle experienced in the
such as solar energy, hydroelectric energy, wind energy, geothermal energy, or biomass or
waste as a primary fuel.
In solar photovoltaic systems, solar cells made of semiconductive material arranged in
a panel system generate electricity. Huss, Richmond & Badger, Alternative Generation Technologies: Can They Compete., PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 15, 1984, at 17, 21 [hereinafter cited as
Huss]. Solar thermal electric systems use a large reflector surface to convert sunlight into
electricity. Id. at 21-22. Since both systems utilize the sun's energy, there is no concern for
long-run fuel availability or cost, or pollution.
Small scale hydroelectric power is produced by hydraulically driven generators. Id.
at 21. The power produced by these facilities ranges from approximately 50 kilowatts
(kW) on up. Id. The technology is well developed, efficient, and has a long life. Id. Aside
from downstream environmental consequences, hydroelectric power creates virtually no
pollution or environmental concerns. Id.
Wind power creates electricity using horizontal axis or vertical axis wind turbines. Id
at 22. Like solar systems, wind generation systems have minimal environmental impact
and unlimited fuel available. Id. Wind turbine capacities generally range up to 7.5 megawatts and are usually grouped in wind farms. Id According to one group of authorities,
wind turbines are "best suited for peaking and fuel saving operations." Id See generally
Oppedahl & Tarduno, Wind Energy Conversion, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 431 (1981).
Geothermal resources produce electricity by converting thermal energy into mechanical energy, which is in turn converted into electricity. Huss, supra, at 20. Both the liquidand vapor-dominated technologies are well suited for 20 to 50 megawatt operations. Id.
Economic viability for geothermal energy systems is not expected before 1990. Id. at 21.
Wood and other biomass material may be burned to generate steam which is then
used to produce electricity. Id at 22. Biomass resources include agricultural crops and
their residues, urban solid wastes, farm animal wastes, and special energy crops such as
cattails. 3 MINNESOTA ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY REVIEW 9-10 (1980). One study has
determined that wood-fired steam plants are suitable for operations of up to 50 megawatts. Huss, supra, at 22. Biomass resources are generally less expensive than oil or coal,
yet cause some ecological concerns due to carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions
when combustion is incomplete. Id
2. "Cogeneration is the combined production of power and useful heat by the sequential use of energy from one fuel source-the reject heat of one process becomes the
DYNAMICS CORP., STATE
RESOURCE
energy input into a subsequent process."
RULEMAKING AND UTILITY PRICING FOR COGENERATION I (1983); see alsoJoskow, Industrial Cogenerationand Electriciy Production in the United States, in REGULATORY REFORM AND
PUBLIC UTILITIES 65, 65-7 (M. Crew ed. 1982); Cross, Cogeneration:Its Potentialand Incentives
for Development, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 236, 236-37 (1979); Pratt, Cogeneration.A Successid
Response to the Energy Crisi.', 9 FORDHAM URB. L. REV. 483, 485-86 (1981); Diamond,
CogenerationJars the Power Indust, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1984, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
3. See generally Gentry, Public Utility Participation in Decentrahzed Power Production, 5
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1981); Lancaster & Tarr, Economic Impact of Alternative Energy
Development in Minnesota, 2 WM. MITCHELL ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1984).
4. R. PIERCE, JR., G. ALLISON & P. MARTIN, ECONOMIC REGULATION: ENERGY
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1970's, attributable in large part to the oil embargo, underscored
the need to develop energy policies that utilize renewable resources
not subject to foreign manipulation.
Second, although there is a great need for additional generation
capacity to be built before the year 2000," utilities are reluctant to
build large generating plants. 6 Economic conditions, the regulatory climate, and uncertainty over future demands have discouraged utilities from constructing new power plants.

7

Third, growing awareness of the negative environmental effects
of conventional generation, such as nuclear wastes and hazards, 8
739 (1980). Pierce breaks down the generation of electricity in the United States by energy source, stating that:
[Gleneration of electricity currently accounts for about 75 percent of total U.S.
consumption of coal, almost 100 percent of U.S. consumption of uranium and
hydropower, approximately 15 percent of U.S. consumption of natural gas, and
approximately 10 percent of total U.S. consumption of oil.
Id
5. See Gentry, supra note 3, at 297 (industry analysts expect electricity demands to
triple by the year 2000); Smartt, Utilties Found to Be Interested in Energy Alternatioes, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Nov. 10, 1983, at 4 (noting that authorities including the U.S. Department
of Energy expect a power shortage in the next decade). Joskow and Schmalensee wrote:
The decline of the nuclear power industry is at least partially a result of the
financial incentives that the current regulatory system gives to utilities; these
incentives necessarily lead utilities to avoid capital-intensive projects with long
lead times. . . . [Tihe nuclear industry's problems have other important sources
as well. Recent deferrals and cancellations of all types of generating plants reflect fairly dramatic reductions in the expected rate of growth in the demand for
electricity. Furthermore utilities in many parts of the country face severe siting
and environmental problems for large coal-fired and nuclear plants that necessarily constrain expansion.
P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER 223-24 n.12 (1983).
6. P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 5, at 223-24 n. 12. One commentator
recently wrote:
[Plast practice has been to increase the pace of new power plant construction,
but discouraging economic and regulatory developments . . . are making some
utilities reluctant to embark upon a new wave of plant construction. Instead,
they are examining energy generating alternatives in an attempt to scale back
demand projections and defer the need for expensive new power plants.
Smartt, supra note 5, at 4.
7. Smartt, supra note 5, at 4. Two recent studies to forecast power plant construction
needs resulted in predictions differing by 311,000 megawatts. The U.S. Department of
Energy's study estimates that in the year 2000, capacity of 463,000 megawatts would be
available, while the capacity needed would be 901,000 megawatts. This situation leaves
438,000 megawatts of capacity to be assumed by new construction. The Department of
Energy estimated that the cost for the needed new construction would be one trillion
dollars in 1982 dollars. Ray, The Megawatt Debate, ELECTRICAL WORLD, Oct. 1983, at 4.
In contrast, a study by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress
estimates capacity requirements of 638,000 megawatts in 2000, resulting in a capacity
shortfall of 127,000 megawatts. Id
8. See generally Flax, Radroacthve Waste Management, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 259
(1981); Friedland, The New Hazardous Waste Management System. Regulation of Wastes or
TRANSPORTATION AND UTILITIES
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acid rain, 9 and air, water, and solid waste pollution, ° highlight
the importance of developing electric power sources with predictable and benign environmental and health consequences.
These three developments create great potential for expanding
small power production. Policy makers are stressing the need for
avoiding heavy reliance on any one energy source and for developing a balanced and mixed system of energy resources. I I One recent study estimates that, by the year 2000, alternative energy
programs will generate at least 30,000 megawatts of electricity12
the equivalent of thirty large central station generating plants.
Wind-generated electrical power is the most likely of the alternative sources of renewable energy to make a significant contribution to the utility grid. 13 Historically, wind energy played a
central role in the commercial development of many nations 14 and
Wasted Regulation?, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 89 (198 1); Hunt, Disposal ofradioactive wastes,
BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Apr. 1984, at 44; Rea, Hazardous Waste Pollution.- The Need for a
Different Statutogy Approach, 12 ENVTL. LAW 443 (1982); Wolf, Hazardous Waste Trals and
Tribulations, 13 ENVTL. LAW 367 (1983); The Economics of Contamination, THE ATLANTIC,
Oct. 1984, at 29; High-Level Politics over Low-Level Waste, 223 ScI. MAG. 258 (1984).
9. See generally Green, Sulfur Emission and Acid Rain. A Least-cost Approach to the Problem,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Dec. 8, 1983, at 46; Ray, The Acid-Rain Stalemate, ELECTRICAL WORLD,

Dec. 1983, at 4; Triso, Acid Precipitation: Causes, Consequences, Controls, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Feb. 3, 1983, at 19; Trisko & Wayland, Acid Rain Control and Public Utility Regulation, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Aug. 30, 1984, at 15; Presidential Acid Rain Study Released on Capitol Hill,PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Sept. 13, 1984, at 38.

10.

See generally Davis, Kurtock, Leape & Magill, The Clean Air Act Amendments of1977

Away From Technology-Forcing?, 2 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1977); Del Duca, The Clean Air

Act: A Realistic Assessment ofCost-Efectiveness, 5 HARV. ENVTL.L. REV. 184 (1981); Koch &
Leone, The Clean Water Act: Unexpected Impacts on Indust, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 84
(1979); Silverstein, Interstate Air Pollution: Unresolved Issues, 3 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 291
(1979).
11. See, e.g., Letter to the Editor by Robert C. Odle, Jr., Assistant Secretary, U.S.
Department of Energy, Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1984, at 27, col. 1.
12. Smartt, supra note 5, at 4 (reviewing findings of a 1983 study by the Investor
Responsibility Research Center).

13.

See Flavin, A Renaissance for Wzd Power, ENV'T, Oct. 1981, at 31; see also C.

DEWINKEL, AN ASSESSMENT OF WIND CHARACTERISTICS AND WIND ENERGY SYSTEMS

FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES 12-13 (1979).
MADIO, R.

MCARTHUR & W.

See generally F. MARCH, E. DLO'rr, D. KORN, F.

VACHON, WIND POWER FOR THE ELECTRIC-UTILITY IN-

DUSTRY (1981); D. MARIER, WIND POWER FOR THE HOMEOWNER (1981); D. McGuIGAN, HARNESSING THE WIND FOR HOME ENERGY (1978); MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF

ENERGY, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ECONOMICS OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY
RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGIES IN MINNESOTA (1983) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMICS
OF ALTERNATIVE

ENERGY];

P.

VOSBURGH,

COMMERCIAL

APPLICATIONS

OF WIND

POWER (1983); McGowan & Heronemus, Ocean Thermal and Wind Power: Alternative Energy
Sources Based on Natural Solar Collection, 4 ENVTL. AFF. 629 (1975).
14. See McGowan & Heronemus, supra note 13, at 631.
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has been traced to the ancient Egyptians.' During the latter half
of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, wind power provided energy for a variety of uses-including
the generation of electric power. 16 Wind-generated electrical
power is relatively cheap, 7 safe, and raises no major environmental concerns.' 8 It is the principal small power source under 100
kilowatts in Minnesota and the upper midwest. 19 Wind is the only
small power form expected to be economically viable before 1990,
except for site-specific small scale hydropower, biomass, and
cogeneration.

20

There is no universal solution to the energy problem. Renewa15. See Flavin, supra note 13, at 32.
16. Ste C. DEWINKEL, supra note 13, at 12. Denmark greatly relied on wind-powered
electric generators for power during both world wars. See id.,Flavin, supra note 13, at 32.
Until 1934, when the Rural Electrification Administration provided farms in the United
States with subsidized electricity, wind power was a source of electricity for many American farmers. See C. DEWINKEL, supra note 13, at 12.
17. See Flavin, supra note 13, at 33. In contrast to other forms of electrical generation,
wind power requires an initial capital investment (for a wind machine) yet incurs very
little cost thereafter. The marginal costs of wind generation are significantly lower than
other forms of generation. One report states that costs for wind energy machines have
stabilized at about $2000 to $4000 per kilowatt. Don't Delay, New Renewable Energy Sources,
PUB. POWER, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 75. A large series construction could possibly reduce
costs to about $1500 per kilowatt. Id.
18. L. COLT, WIND ENERGY: LEGAL ISSUES AND INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS 17-18
(SERI/TR-62-241, June 1979) (some commentators suggest that large wind energy systems may create microwave interference, slight climate modifications, and noise and visual pollution); see infra note 243.
19. Huss, supra note 1,at 20 table 2. One commentator reports:
In the midwest, only extreme southwestern Kansas and the Black Hills of South
Dakota have a greater wind resource than western and southern Minnesota,
which are the areas of greatest wind energy in the state. Eastern and north central Minnesota are areas of low wind resources. Some locations in western Minnesota have estimated annual average wind speeds of 13 miles per hour at 10
meters above ground and 16 miles per hour at 50 meters above ground.
Lancaster, Costs and Benefits of Commercial/Industria Alternative Energy Conversion, in EcONOMICS OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, supra note 13, at 10-11.
One report estimates that wind power and other alternative energy sources in Minnesota "could result in an additional $4.5 billion in gross state product, $3.7 billion in personal income, $200 million in state tax revenues, and 151,000 jobs in the year 2000.
Lancaster & Tarr, supra note 3, at 3.
20. Huss, supra note 1, at 20. The wind industry has experienced significant growth in
the past several years due in large part to federal and state tax incentives. In California,
for example, which has the most favorable energy tax incentives in the U.S., there were
230 megawatts of wind power capacity in place by the end of 1983, compared to 70 megawatts in the rest of the country. F. SISSINE, WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND UTILITY
CAPACITY CREDITS: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH, IMPLEMENTATION AND POLICY ISSUES
UNDER THE PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY PRACTICES ACT (PURPA) (Congressional
Research Service Report No. 84-101 SPR, June 1984). These figures are expected to
double by the end of 1984. Id.
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ble sources of energy offer great potential but much work must be
done to overcome barriers to the implementation of these technologies. Institutional entry barriers are large when the investment is
small and investors, such as farmers buying wind generation
equipment, have limited resources. At the present stage of development and with such small investments, fine-tuning rates and
contract terms may be more costly than the benefits.
This Article focuses on the problems of electricity generators
having a capacity of less than 100 kilowatts. It first explores the
federal regulation, under PURPA, of on-site electrical generation.2 1 It then discusses Minnesota's statutory and regulatory
scheme as one state's response to PURPA. 22 Using wind power as
the example, the Article examines the two critical areas for small
power producers: a standard contract under which utilities buy
back the power produced by small generators 2 3 and the prices for
the buy-back of power based on avoided cost. 24 Although this Article focuses on cogeneration and power producers under 100 kilowatts, the same analysis applies to other producers functioning
under similar conditions.
II.

201 AND 210 OF PURPA AND THE MINNESOTA
COGENERATION AND SMALL POWER PRODUCTION
ACT

SECTIONS

In 1978, Congress enacted five laws designed to reshape national
energy policies. 25 The Public Utilities Regulatory Practices Act

(PURPA) of 1978 was part of this new energy package. 26 Sections
27
201 and 210 of PURPA were designed to promote cogeneration
and small power production 28 as viable alternatives to large scale
21. See tnfra notes 25-67 and accompanying text (discussion of PURPA).
22. See infra notes 68-89 and accompanying text.
23. See zn/ra notes 90-149 and accompanying text.
24. See tfa notes 150-245 and accompanying text.
25. The five laws are: The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (relevant sections codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 796(17), 824, 2601); The Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174
(1978) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1202); The National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub.
L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 8201); The Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (1978) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 8301); The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350
(1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3301).
26. See Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617 § 210, 92
Stat. 3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1982)).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1982).
28. Id
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central power stations. The express purpose of sections 201 and
210 was to remove regulatory and market barriers that prevent the
29
commercial feasibility of on-site electrical generation.
PURPA is a unique, creative federal law that contemplates a
partnership between state and federal authorities that regulate
utilities. 30 PURPA's overall scheme includes increasing the conservation of electrical energy, improving utilities' efficient use of
facilities and resources, equalizing retail rates for consumers, improving distribution of power, and encouraging the development
of renewable, alternative sources of energy. 3 1 The comprehensiveness of this regulation is directly related to the magnitude of the
32
national energy crisis.
Several PURPA provisions advance the federal goal of encouraging the development of renewable energy technologies by utilizing pre-existing state regulatory schemes. 33 PURPA expressly
regulates federally owned utilities and the interstate activities of
federally regulated utilities. 34 It charges the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with the duty to promulgate rules requiring "electric utilities to purchase electric energy from any
cogeneration facility or small power production facility qualifying
under Federal rules."' 35 PURPA also mandates implementation of
29. See L. BUCK & L. GOODWIN, ALTERNATIVE ENERGY: THE FEDERAL ROLE 7-I
(1982); see also Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Final Rule (for PURPA regulations) 45 Fed. Reg. 12,214, 12,215 (1980) (codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.301-.602 (1984)).
30. In Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), the
state of Mississippi brought a declaratory judgment action alleging that PURPA was unconstitutional. Mississippi averred that PURPA and its provisions violated the commerce
clause and the tenth amendment. The Supreme Court found no merit in the commerce
clause issue. Id. at 753. With respect to the tenth amendment issue, the court stated:
Unlike the Commerce Clause question, the Tenth Amendment issue presented
here is somewhat novel. This case obviously is related to National League of
Cities v Usury, 426 US 833. . . insofar as both concern principles of state sovereignty. But there is a significant difference as well . . . . In PURPA . . . the

Federal Government attempts to use state regulatory machinery to advance federal goals. To an extent, this presents an issue of first impression.
Id at 758. The Court went on to uphold PURPA in its entirety. Id. at 771.
31. See id. at 746.
32. Id at 745, 756. "Congress naturally concluded that the national energy problem
was nationwide in scope, and that these developments demonstrated the need to establish
federal standards regarding retail sales of electricity, as well as federal attempts to encourage conservation and more efficient use of scarce energy resources." Id. at 756-57
(footnotes omitted).
33. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 824(a).
34. Id.
35. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 98 A.D.2d 337, 379, 471
N.Y.S.2d 684, 686 (1983); see 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a); see also American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 404-06 (1983).
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FERC-promulgated rules by state utility regulatory agencies. 36
A.

Sections 201 and 210 of PURPA

Sections 201 and 210 of PURPA accomplish three major goals.
First, FERC can compel a utility to interconnect and to purchase
electrical energy from cogeneration and small power producers
that meet the specific criteria of section 201 and accompanying
FERC regulations. 37 Prior to the passage of PURPA, utilities were
not required to purchase power from cogeneration or small power
production facilities. 38 Second, PURPA prohibits utilities from
charging unreasonably high or discriminatory rates for back-up or
auxiliary services delivered to on-site generators. 39 Finally,
PURPA precludes classification of cogenerators or small power
producers as utilities, thus exempting cogenerators and small
power producers from a significant amount of federal and state
40
utility regulation.
These provisions of PURPA lowered many of the all but insurmountable entry barriers faced by cogenerators and small power
producers. 4' But not all entry barriers faced by small power producers were addressed in PURPA. For example, PURPA provides
almost no protection to small power producers from the monopsony power of the utilities in the negotiation of contract terms.
Some states, like Minnesota, 42 have passed mini-PURPA legislation to both reinforce and further extend the protection of the
small power producer from the monopsony power of the utility.
Section 201 is the definitional section of PURPA. A small
power production facility is defined as one which produces electricity using a primary fuel source of biomass, waste, renewable
resources, geothermal resources, or any combination thereof. 43 In
addition, section 201 requires FERC to promulgate rules and regulations that further define the characteristics of small power pro36. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f).
37. See infra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
38. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (discussion of qualifying cogeneration and small power
production facilities); cf L. BUCK & L. GOODWIN, supra note 29, at 7-2.
39. See L. BUCK & L. GOODWIN, supra note 29, at 7-3 (discussion of qualifying
cogeneration facility).
40. Id, see also 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.601-.602.
41. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3.
42. MINN. STAT. § 216B. 164 (1982 & Supp. 1983); see infra notes 68-89 and accompanying text. Nine other states have enacted "mini-PURPA" laws. See The March of EvensNew Hampshire, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 15, 1982, at 50, 51.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(A).
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duction facilities within the ambit of PURPA. 44 Small power
production facilities meeting the requirements of FERC regulations are called qualifying small power production facilities

(QFs). 45
Under PURPA, a small power production facility qualifies if it
meets the specialized size, fuel use, and ownership criteria. 46 A
qualifying small power production facility may not have a generating capacity in excess of eighty megawatts. 4 7 Seventy-five percent of the total electrical output of the facility must be derived
from use of "biomass, waste, renewable resources, geothermal resources, or any combination thereof as a primary fuel."148 The
ownership criteria disqualify small power production facilities that
are owned by any person 49 that is engaged in the business of generating or selling electric power.5 0
Section 210 contains the substantive provisions of PURPA that
implement the exemption from state and federal regulation and
the purchase requirements. 5 I All QFs satisfying FERC regulations
promulgated pursuant to section 210 are exempted from federal
52
statutes regulating electric utilities.
Exemption of QFs from state law and regulation is accomplished in a bifurcated fashion. 53 The FERC regulations exempt
QFs from "[s]tate law or regulation respecting: (i) The rates of
44. Id § 796(17)(A)(ii).
45. Id § 796(17)(c); see 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.203-.204, 292.206.
46. These criteria are set out in 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.204, 292.206.
47. Id § 292.204. One watt is the unit of power in the International System equal to
one joule per second. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1367 (2d ed. 1982). A
joule is a unit of energy equal to the work done when a current of one ampere is passed
through a resistance of one ohm for one second. Id. at 691.
48. 18 C.F.R. § 292.204.
49. Under FERC regulations, person includes any legal person or entity:
For purposes of this section, a cogeneration or small power production facility
shall be considered to be owned by a person primarily engaged in the generation
or sale of electric power, if more than 50 percent of the equity interest in the
facility is held by an electric utility or utilities. . . . If a wholly or partially
owned subsidiary of an electric utility or electric utility holding company has an
ownership interest of a facility, the subsidiary's ownership interest shall be considered as ownership by an electric utility or electric utility holding company.
Id § 292.206(b).
50. Id § 292.206(a).
51. 16 U.S.C. §824a-3(e).
52. Id Any QF with a capacity less than or equal to 30 megawatts is exempt from the
majority of the provisions of the Federal Power Act, 18 C.F.R. § 292.601, and exempt
from the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Id § 292.602.
53. The FERC regulations exempt qualifying facilities from state regulation generally with respect to rates and financial and organizational regulation. 18 C.F.R.
§ 292.602. In addition, FERC regulations require state regulatory agencies to promulgate
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electric utilities; and (ii) The financial and organizational regulation of electric utilities. ' '5 4 This exemption from state law is qualified. FERC regulations require each state regulatory authority to
promulgate and implement regulations that govern transactions
between state-regulated utilities and QFs. 55 The FERC regulations provide for dual authority and responsibility with respect to
federal and state utility regulation. 56 Basic concepts, such as determining whether a generation facility is qualified, 57 are reserved to
FERC whereas the specifics of the implementation of PURPA are
58
left to state regulatory authorities.
Section 210(b) prescribes the factors to be considered by FERC
and state utilities commissions in setting the rates to be paid by
utilities for power purchased from QFs. 59 The buy-back rate must

"be just and reasonable to the electric consumers of the electric
utility and in the public interest, and . . . shall not discriminate

against qualifying cogenerators or qualifying small power producers." 6 Section 210(b) also prohibits a buy-back rate that exceeds
"the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electric
energy. '"61 The incremental cost of alternative electric energy is
the cost of the electric energy that the utility would generate or
purchase from another source, but for the interconnection with a
QF.

62

These costs are also known as avoided costs. 63 The regula-

tions issued by FERC provide that the required rate of power from
QFs must equal the avoided costs of the utility.64 The avoided

costs of utilities are determined by the information that FERC and
state public utility regulations require the utilities to file with the
65
appropriate regulatory commission.
The key provisions of the FERC regulations are those requiring
electric utilities to interconnect with QFs and requiring utilities to
purchase power from QFs at rates equal to the utilities' full
rules and regulations implementing 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.301-.308 within one year of their
effective date.
54. Id § 292.602(c).
55. Id.
56. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
57. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.203.
58. S e id § 292.401-403.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b).
60. Id
61. Id
62. Id § 824a-3(d).
63. See 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.304(a)-(b).
64. Id
65. See id § 292.302.
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avoided costs."" The underlying rationale behind these central
provisions was the elimination of market entry barriers and the
imposition of a buy-back rate that created a financial incentive for
67
small power production.
B.

The Mnnesota Statute and PUC Regulation

In 1981, the Minnesota Legislature enacted the Minnesota
Cogeneration and Small Power Production Act (MCSPPA)." 8
The express purpose of this amendment to the Minnesota Public
Utilities Act was to "give the maximum possible encouragement to
cogeneration and small power production consistent with protection of the ratepayers and the public."' 9 The MCSPPA complements PURPA and carries out PURPA's mandate: the statute
strictly regulates the transactions between state-regulated utilities
and QFs.7"
The regulations concerning buy-back rates issued by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission classify QFs into four categories
determined by QF capacity: (1) 20 kilowatts or less; (2) not in
excess of 40 kilowatts and greater than 20 kilowatts; (3) not in excess of 100 kilowatts and greater than 40 kilowatts; and (4) greater
than 100 kilowatts. 71 QFs in the first two categories are entitled to
net energy billing. 72 Class three QFs sell and purchase power at

rates determined, in part, by the time-of-day. 73 The justification
for the capacity classification scheme is the varying possibility of
net input associated with the capacity of a QF.7 4 For example, the
possibility that a twenty-kilowatt QF will have an energy surplus is
less than the potential of an energy surplus for a facility having a
capacity greater than 100 kilowatts. Consequently, the regulations
attempt to insure more precise avoided cost pricing for QFs with a
larger capacity. 75 Presumably, the transaction and information
66. Id.§ 292.303; see also supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
67. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303.
68. Minnesota Cogeneration and Small Power Production Act of 1981, ch. 237, § 1,
1981 Minn. Laws 1023 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 216B.164 (1982 & Supp. 1983)).
69. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 1 (1982).
70. Id § 216B.164, subd. 2 (Supp. 1983).
71. Id., subd. 3; see MINN. R. pts. 7835.3200-.3300 (Supp. 1984).
72. MINN. R. pt. 7835.3300, subp. I (Supp. 1984); see infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (discussion of net energy billing).
73. MINN. R. pt. 7835.3500, subp. I (1983).
74. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
75. Calculating avoided costs is a complex and expensive process. There is little justification for undertaking an avoided cost study for a number of small 20 to 40 kW facilities
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costs are justified by a greater potential for energy surplus. Additionally, the regulations provide "simultaneous purchase and sale"
for certain QFs. 76 This regulation requires the utilities to bill the
QF for energy consumed at the applicable retail rate and to
purchase energy at a rate based on full avoided costs. 7 7 If a QF

purchases power from a utility on a time-of-day basis, then the
7
regulations require the QFs to sell power on a time-of-day basis.

3

Subdivision three of MCSPPA requires utilities to bill QFs with
a capacity of less than forty kilowatts for the net energy supplied
by the utility to the QF. 79 If the QF provides a net input into the
utility grid, the utility is required to pay a rate based on avoided
costs as defined in the FERC regulations.8 0 Subdivision four compels utilities to pay their full avoided energy and capacity costs for
power purchased from QFs with a capacity in excess of forty
kilowatts. 8 '
Net energy billing is perhaps the most significant incentive that
MCSPPA provides owners of QFs. A QF that does not offer power

82
for sale on a time-of-day basis qualifies for net energy billing.

The central idea behind net energy billing is equalization of
purchase and sale rates. The scheme requires QF owners to pay
only for electricity required by the facility in excess of the power
generated on-site.8 3 Thus, if a QF generates more power on-site
than power consumed, the QF owner can elect to be compensated
in one of two ways: (1) the standard retail rate charged the facility
if the QF has a capacity of twenty kilowatts or less; or (2) the util84
ity's avoided costs.

Similarly, QF owners can elect a simultaneous purchase and
that will generate very little net input into the utility grid. See generally in a notes 150-245
and accompanying text (discussion of avoided costs).
76. See MINN. R. pt. 7835.3400, subp. 1 (1983).
77. Id pt. 7835.3400, subp. 2 (1983).
78. Id pt. 7835.3500, subp. 1 (1983). "Time-of-day rates are required for qualifying
facilities with capacity greater than 40 kilowatts and less than or equal to 100 kilowatts,
and they are optional for qualifying facilities with capacity less than or equal to 40 kilowatts." Id
79. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 3(a) (1982 & Supp. 1983).
80. Id § 216B. 164, subd. 3(b).
81. Id § 216B.164, subd. 4 (1982).
82. MINN. R. pt. 7835.3300, subp. 1 (1983); see also L. McDonough, The Utility-Small
Power Producer and the Development of Decentralized Solar Energy Technologies in
Minnesota (1983) (unpublished paper) (on file at the William Mitchell Law Review
Office).
83. MINN. R. pt. 7835.3300 (1983).
84. Id., subp. 3 (1983).
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sale billing rate if power is not offered for sale to the utility on a
time-of-day basis. 8 5 Simultaneous purchase and sale billing re-

quires the utility to charge QF owners the applicable retail rate
and compensate QF owners for all power produced. 86 Utilities are
required to buy power produced at a rate based upon the utility's
8
avoided costs.

7

Strict regulation of transactions between QFs and state-regulated utilities facilitates elimination of market entry barriers for
QFs. Neither PURPA nor the FERC regulations focus on the
problem of the monopsony power of the utility in specifying contract terms. In addressing this issue, the principal 1983 amendment to MCSPPA provides for a uniform statewide form of
contract for QFs under forty kilowatts in capacity. 88 The 1983
amendments also provide for an interim benchmark buy-back rate
for QFs under forty kilowatt capacity.8 9
III.

THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

A

SMALL

POWER PRODUCER AND THE UTILITY

The Solar Energy Research Institute has estimated that 3.8 million rural homes and 370,000 farms are particularly good candidates for small wind generation systemsY0 The establishment of a
uniform statewide contract allows owners of QFs to spread transaction costs that ordinarily would be borne by individual QF owners. The uniform contract equalizes the bargaining position of the
parties and more accurately reflects the useful exchange and production of information found in a competitive market. An additional advantage of the uniform contract is the reduction in
overall costs incurred by all parties and the concomitant encouragement of small power production and cogeneration
development.
Economics provides tools to analyze the contractual relationship
85. Id pt. 7835.3400, subp. 1 (1983).
86. Id, subp. 2 (1983).
87. MINN. STAT. § 216B. 164, subd. 4(b).
88. See id. § 216B.164, subd. 6 (Supp. 1983); stee a/so MINN. R. pts. 7835.3300-.3500
(1983) (providing elements of uniform statewide contract); id pt. 7835.9910 (Supp. 1984)
(Uniform Statewide Contract For Cogeneration and Small Power Production Facilities)
(reproduced infra at Appendix A) [hereinafter cited as Appendix A].
89. See MINN. STAT. § 216B. 164, subd. 3.
90. Flavin, supra note 13, at 35. "Based on this [1980] study it can be estimated that
the United States could one day have as many as five million small wind turbines in use,
providing about 25,000 megawatts. . . of generating capacity-half as much as nuclear
power currently provides." Id. (footnote omitted).
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between the small power producer and the utility. The first two
sections below outline the problems of small power producers
posed by the monopsony power of the utilities and the high information and transaction costs involved in negotiating with the utility. Part C looks at specific examples of some of the barriers to
contracting in Minnesota. Part D focuses on the possible responses
of utilities commissions to those issues.
A.

Monopsony Power

The utilities are the only available buyers for the power generated by small power producers because it is not economically feasible for a small producer to construct a transmission line to
potential buyers of the power it produces. Where there is a single
buyer of an input, a monopsony exists. 91 The "chief feature of
monopsonistic exploitation is that each unit of input" purchased
by a monopsonist will "not receive in pay an amount equal to its
contribution to total receipts" of the monopsonist. 92 "Because of
[the monopsony], fewer units of the input are employed and the
93
unit price of each is less" than would otherwise be the case.
Parties to a contract will pursue their own best interests in the
contracting process; they will pursue opportunistic behavior to the
degree the market relationships permit. In this framework, opportunism involves parties' "ex ante and ex post willingness to lie,
mislead, disguise, distort, and confuse, in pursuit of their self-interest."'94 The monopsonist utility can therefore raise entry barriers
by engaging in drawn-out contract negotiations requiring time
and expensive expert assistance and by imposing unfavorable contract terms. The small producer subject to this monopsony power
has no alternative buyer and is a contract term taker. 95 Even after
entry by a small power producer, the utility can inflict continuing
high transaction costs by forcing the small producer to pursue
costly adjudicative procedures before the utilities commission to
enforce contractual or regulatory provisions.
91.

FERGUSON & GOULD, MICROECONOMic THEORY 407 (4th ed. 1975).

92. Id at 416.
93. Id
94. P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 5, at 110-1I (footnote omitted); see also
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. &
EcON. 233, 241-42 (1979).
95. The term "contract term taker" implies that the party does not have sufficient
leverage or bargaining power to negotiate favorable contract terms and is required to
accept terms "as is," if he or she is to enter into the transaction.
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These fears are not purely theoretical. 96 In the past, utilities
have sought to use their monopsony power in transmission to eliminate competitors in competitive vertical stages of the industry. 97
For example, the trial court in UnitedStates v. Otter Tail Power Co.98
found that Otter Tail's "control over transmission facilities in
much of its service area gives it substantial effective control over
potential competition from municipal ownership. By its refusal to
sell or wheel power, defendant prevents that competition from surfacing." 99 The United States Supreme Court agreed that "Otter
Tail's refusals to sell at wholesale or to wheel were solely to prevent
municipal power systems from eroding its monopolistic position." 10 0 Just as municipal power systems pose a threat to vertically integrated utilities by competing for municipal distribution
franchises, small power producers are perceived as a threat to utilities' monopoly in generation.' 0 ' As one commentator notes, "harassment of nonintegrated competitors might . . . be 'an
investment in entry barriers' aimed at limiting existing rivals' ex10 2
pansion and discouraging new single-stage entry."
B.

Information Costs and Transaction Costs

The small power producer faces severe disadvantage in the contracting process in terms of information costs and transaction costs.
The collection of information is expensive and the party possessing
superior information relating to the issues being negotiated has the
advantage. Thus, the negotiators who produce information most
efficiently come out ahead.
The utility's cost of information will be much lower than that of
the small power producer for several reasons. First, the utility will
be able to spread the fixed costs of collecting information concerning contracts with small power producers over a large number of
interconnections. The utility's costs for information per contract
96. See infra
notes 111-26 and accompanying text (examples of contracting problems
between small power producers and utilities).
97. See Gentry, supra note 3, at 315-18.
98. 331 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971), afd in part, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
99. Id at 61.
100. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1973). For a discussion of other cases involving utilities' refusal to wheel power for municipalities, see Norton
& Early, Lbnitatins on the Obhi'ation to Provide Access to Electrc Transmission and Distribution
Lines, 5 ENERGY L.J. 47, 57-67 (1984).
101. F. SISSINE, supra note 20, at 10-14.
102.

F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

304 (2d ed. 1980).
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negotiation therefore will be low. The small producer does not
engage in a large number of interconnections and so cannot spread
the fixed costs of information over many negotiations. Second, the
utility already has most of the needed data and personnel skilled in
the use of such data. Small power producers generally do not have
the data base or skilled personnel readily available. These economies of scale in information production put the small power producers at a disadvantage in negotiation with the utility. 10 3 Also,
resources are wasted when the costly process of learning about and
developing data must be performed by each small producer
independently.
An additional problem exists when transactions involve specialized immobile assets. 10 4 Assets which are mobile and unspecialized involve few problems because the parties can sell the
productive assets to buyers without difficulty. Specialized and immobile assets involve locked-in costs, many of which cannot be recovered by leaving a particular activity or transaction. Such
locked-in investments are subject to costly ex post opportunistic
behavior by the other party to the contract. 0 5 The investment of
the small power producer in generation facilities is clearly locked
in and subject to opportunistic behavior by the utility.
Any given sum of transaction costs related to contracting will
pose a larger barrier to entry for smaller scale generation projects
than for larger scale projects. The costs of negotiating a contract
are "up front" and must be paid by the small power producer
before financing can be secured. This is the most difficult risk cap06

ital to secure. 1

The installed cost of a small wind generator, for example, can
103. One commentator provides the following illustration:
When a customer parks a car in a parking lot he enters into a contract specifying
liability for theft or damage and a number of other terms. Bargaining over the
terms of the contract is usually not possible; neither the lot attendant nor the

customer would normally be capable of preparing a valid agreement and lawyers' fees would make redrafting out of the question. The lot owner who will
enter into a large number of agreements will find it in his best interest to have a
lawyer "mass produce" a standard contract: this contract should reflect the
owner's interests in the best possible manner. If customers could band together

somehow and spread the costs they might be able to render the contract terms
more favorable to themselves.
Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J. L. & ECON. 461, 462 (1974).
104. Williamson, supra note 94, at 239-41.
105. P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 5, at I 1; Williamson, supra note 94, at

239-41.
106. Address by Ken Lever, President of Actaeon Corp., A Conference On Public Policy Issues On Cogeneration And Small Power Production (July 19, 1984).
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range from $5,000 to $20,000 for a three to five kilowatt generator, 10 7 $25,000 to $32,000 for a ten to seventeen kilowatt generator,
and up to $100,000 to $150,000 for a sixty:five to 160 kilowatt generator. 0 8 The cost of a contract negotiation with a utility, including an avoided cost study, is estimated at approximately
$100,000.109 Note that the costs of negotiating the five megawatt
Rapidan hydroelectric project in southern Minnesota were approximately $250,000 on an investment of $8,000,000. 10° Even if
standard rates eliminate the need for an avoided cost study, the
attorneys' and consultants' fees associated with the contracting
process pose a significant barrier to the entry of small power producers. For the smallest projects in particular, these fees should be
minimized if not eliminated.
C

Barriers for Small Power Producers t'n Contractual Relationships
Wzth Utilh'es in Minnesota

Prior to the 1983 amendments in Minnesota,"' each utility unilaterally drafted its own contracts with small power producers.
These had to be consistent with the rules of the Public Utilities
Commission. Small power producers faced extended contract negotiations of up to five months' 2 and had to seek expert assistance.
A review of the utility filings submitted as of July 29, 1983,1 3 to
check compliance with Minnesota Statutes section 216B.164, and
the Public Utilities Commission's rules, indicated major differences between some filings and the rules. The major problems
were in the areas of technical requirements, changes in legal rights
and liabilities existing under the rules, insurance, access to the
4
small power producer's facilities, and attorney's fees in disputes."
107. Flavin, supra note 13, at 34.
108. Telephone interview with Robert Wein, Chief Engineer, Jacobs Wind Electric
Company (Oct. 15, 1984).
109. Address by Derick Dehler, Alternative Energy Consultant, A Conference On
Public Policy Issues On Cogeneration And Small Power Production (June 19, 1984).
110. Telephone interview with Barry Payne, Energy Section Supervisor, Minnesota
Department of Public Service (Oct. 19, 1984).
111. Act of June 8, 1983, ch. 301, §§ 166-171, 1983 Minn. Laws 1678-81 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 216B. 164 (1982)).
112. See, e.g., Wright-Hennepin Cooperative Electric Association, Electric Service
Agreement, Member Owned Generation Facilities, Jan. 1, 1982 (on file at the William
Mitchell Law Review Office).
113. This review, which was conducted by the author, covered the 27 utilities out of
approximately 190 in the state that filed.
114. For example, parts 7835.4800-.5800 of the Minnesota Rules contain interconnection guidelines and state that the utility can include in the contract reasonable technical
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For example, a common provision in the rules and regulations of
a group of cooperative utilities requires that an inspection certificate "issued by the State Electrical Inspector" is required to assure
compliance with the National Electrical Code, 1 5 the National
Electric Safety Code,' 16 and other applicable local electric codes.
An inspection certificate issued by local governing agencies is required to assure compliance with building codes and environmental rules and regulations where applicable. The Public Utility
Commission rules do not require compliance with the relevant
laws and codes." 7 Inspection certificates are not regularly issued
to a homeowner. As a result, the homeowner will not have available the certificate or certificates in question. The inspection certificate requirement of utilities exceeds the rules and acts as an
unreasonable block to interconnection. State electrical inspectors
are generally concerned with compliance only with the National
Electric Code and not the National Electrical Safety Code. In addition, while the QF may have to comply with local building
codes, and environmental rules and regulations, such matters are
not the business of the utility. The inspection certificate requirement by a state electrical inspector is, therefore, one example of an
obstacle to interconnection.' 18
connection and operating specifications for the small power producer. MINN. R. pts.
7835.4800-.5800 (1983). "The utility must be permitted to include in its contract reasonable technical connection and operating specifications for the qualifying facility." Id pt.
7835.4800 (1983). Parts 7835.4800-.5800 also specify that the small producer must adhere
to all applicable national, state, and local codes. This is constrained by part 7835.0800 of
the utility safety standards, which indicates that no standard or procedure will be established to discourage small power production, and parts 7838.1900-.2900 on conditions of
service, which specify that the interconnection between the small power producers and the
utility must comply with the requirements of the National Electric Safety Code. Id pt.
7835.2100 (1983); NATIONAL ELECTRIC SAFETY CODE, INSTITUTE OF ELECTRIC & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS 1980. The question, of course, is what constitutes a reasonable technical connection and operating specification.
115. NATIONAL ELECTRIC CODE, 3 NAT'L FIRE CODE § 70 (National Fire Protection
Association 1984).
116. NATIONAL ELECTRIC SAFETY CODE, supra note 114.
117. MINN. R. pts. 7835.1900-.2900 (1983).
118. A review by the Minnesota Department of Public Services of some of the same
filings indicates "a general lack of compliance with the rule requirements." Letter from
Barry Payne, Energy Section Supervisor, Minnesota Department of Public Service, to
Paul Jacobs, Jacobs Wind Electric Co. (Aug. 17, 1984) (discussing summary of DPS Review Schedules C, D, & E Submittals By Qualifying Cogeneration Facilities to Public
Utilities Commission). The Department is concerned that vague language in the filings
generates a great deal of uncertainty to potential small power producers and could deter
their incentive to interconnect with the utility. Id. For example, the Department noted,
"There is no clear provision, consistent among all utilities, for code and inspection requirements. Several require approvals of non-existent entities." Draft Summary of DPS Re-
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The 1983 amendments to Minnesota Statutes section
216B.164"19 require the Public Utilities Commission to adopt a
uniform statewide contract for small power producers with less
than a forty-kilowatt capacity. But the uniform contract proposed
by the Public Utilities Commission incorporates by reference the
rules, regulations, and policies of the utility.' 20 The rules, regulations, and policies of the utility are to be consistent with the Commission's rules on cogeneration and small power production.' 2'
The small power producer can bring a dispute before the
22
Commission. 1
Although this uniform contract is a major step forward, the
problem with the Commission's approach is that it, in effect, still
has not adopted a uniform contract. The practices evident in the
utility filings indicate that utilities in the state can introduce issues
into the contracting process through the rules and regulations, the
resolution of which will require the small power producer to spend
time and perhaps seek expert assistance. As with the filings previously reviewed, the expert staff of the Public Service Department
may be able to review only some filings and thus review may not
be timely.
There are other ex post contracting problems which have raised
entry barriers for small power producers. For example, even after
a contract has been signed, some utilities have disregarded the net
energy billing provisions for small power producers in violation of
Minnesota law.' 2 3 The small power producer is forced to pursue
time-consuming and expensive remedies with the Public Utilities
Commission, which may ultimately require a formal hearing with
view Schedules C, D, & E Submittals by Qualifying Cogeneration Facilities To Public
Utilities Commission, at 2. The Department observed problems with the filings in the
following areas: insurance, liability, and attorney's fees provisions; the allocation of the
costs of meters; the assessment of utility connection costs; the actuation times for automatic disconnect services; the timing, circumstances, procedures, and liabilities dealing
with manual or automatic reconnection or failure to reconnect small power producers to
the utility distribution line; the provisions for notifying a small power producer that manual disconnect is to occur; the payment by a small producer for utility-owned equipment
which the utility may salvage on early termination of the contract; and the prohibition by
most utilities of an assignment of the contract by a small power producer. Id at 2-3.
119. Act of June 8, 1983, ch. 301, §§ 166-171, 1983 Minn. Laws 1678-81 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 216B.164 (1982)).
13.
120. See infra Appendix A
121. Id. 14.
122. Id. 13.
123. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 5
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I11

legal counsel. 124 Utilities may engage in ex post contracting behavior which merely harasses the small power producer. For example, the utility's monthly bills may reflect inconsistent rates for
power purchased from the small producer, requiring the producer
to pursue adjustments through time-consuming meetings with the
utility. 125

These contracting obstacles apply with greatest force to the
smallest power producers. However, the contracting problems
posed by the utility's monopsony power, the utility's cost and overall resource advantages in negotiation, and the possibilities of ex
post contracting opportunistic behavior by the utility all exist for
larger alternative energy producers as well. At some point, the size
of the investment in an alternative energy project should be sufficiently large so as at least to overcome the utility's cost and overall
26

resource advantages. 1

D.

Uniform Standard Contract

Contracting barriers require a mechanism to induce efficient behavior and to mitigate opportunism. The most promising alternative is for the utilities commission to serve as an agent for small
power producers in the drafting of standardized contract terms.
State regulatory commissions have been involved in varying degrees in the formulation of the contract between the utility and the
small power producer. 27 The approaches taken by the commissions fall within several general categories:
1. The parties negotiate contracts. The commission does not
128
review the contract unless one of the parties protests.
2. The parties negotiate contracts subject to approval by the
state utilities commission.'

29

3. Each utility issues standard contracts which must be ap124. See In re Wesley Anderson, P.U.C. No. E-132/C-83-2982 (1983); Interview with
Stuart Mitchell, Minnesota Public Utilities Commission Staff (Feb. 10, 1983).
125. Letter from Paul R. Jacobs, Vice President of Jacobs Wind Electric Co., to Representative Todd Otis (Sept. 12, 1983).
126. The author is unaware of any empirical study assessing the degree to which the
entry barriers posed by contract negotiation costs may decrease as the size of the investment in alternative energy projects increases. If, for example, costs of experts and attorneys, including a full avoided cost study, are approximately $100,000 for a negotiation,
these costs should be a substantially less significant barrier for projects with total investments of $10 million or more in contrast to projects with total investment of $5 million.
127. See RESOURCE DYNAMICS CORP., supra note 2, at 14-15.
128. See id. Texas and Illinois handle contracts in this way. Id.
129. See id.
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proved by the utility commission.1 30
4. The utility commission mandates a standard contract for
3
use by all the utilities in the state.' 1
Under the latter two options, the parties should also generally
have the option of negotiating their own contract if they both wish
to do so.
Options three and four are far superior to options one and two.
Both one and two impose significant transaction costs on the small
producer because of the time-consuming and expensive adjudicative procedures involved in filing a protest. Option two, involving
utility commission review of each negotiated contract, will cause
substantial delay in effective review because the commissions are
short of expert staff. In Minnesota, for example, it took almost a
year for the Public Sevice Department staff to review only some of
the filings by the utilities.1 32 Option three is feasible for those few
private utilities having large franchise areas, but again poses severe
problems of limited staff and commissioner resources to review the
filing of all municipal and cooperative utilities. For example,
there are approximately 170 of these smaller utilities in Minnesota.1 33 Small power producers should also monitor and have input into the deliberations of the staff and commission. This
involvement will require large amounts of time and perhaps expert
resources which these producers do not have.
The most efficient alternative to deal with the contracting
problems of small producers is a uniform statewide contract. This
option consolidates the input of utilities and small power producers into one proceeding and minimizes the demands on the scarce
resource of staff and commissioner time.
The elements of the uniform statewide contract proposed here
address the contracting problems of small producers with capacity
under 100 kilowatts. Simplicity and understandability are critical
for this group of producers because transaction costs in the form of
attorney or expert fees will significantly deter projects of this investment size. A contract written in confusing technical terms cuts
across the grain of the self reliance of these buyers because it is
beyond the ability of the average buyer to understand and makes
130. See id
131. See, e.g., id; MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 6 (1982).
132. See, e.g., In re Wesley Anderson, P.U.C. No. E-132/C-83-2982 (1983) (complaint
filed Apr. 21, 1982; order issued Jan. 27, 1983).
133. ELECTRIC WORLD, DIRECTORY OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 391 (90th ed. 1981) (including 118 municipal systems and 50 rural electrical cooperatives).
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the buyer unable to monitor the utility's contractual performance.
In addition, many rural buyers will be wary of such a contract
because of the historical populist distrust of utilities in rural areas
of the midwest. There are also some contract requirements which
are only meaningful when applied to larger generators. For example, power factor clauses are not relevant to small power producers
3
under 100 kilowatts in capacity.1

4

The topics to be addressed in the uniform statewide contract
can be divided into two principal areas: the business relationship
with the utility and the technical relationship with the utility.
The outline below indicates the major elements of the contract.
Outline of Uniform Statewide Contract
Part I.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.

I.
J.
K.
Part II.
A.

B.

Business relationship to the utility
Check off to certify compliance with FERC requirements
for status as a qualifying facility.
Purchase price for power and method of payment to the
small producer.
Term.
Cost of interconnection and payment for interconnection.
Liability.
Liability insurance.
Access to small producer's facilities.
Conditions for interruption of either the provision of
power to the facility or the purchase of power from the
facility.
Notice of interruption.
Penalty clause for nonperformance.
Disputes.
Technical relationships with the utility (including safety
issues)
Conformance to the applicable laws and ordinances, including all applicable national, state, and local electric
and safety codes.
Technical requirements for the interconnection and operation of the small facility.

The most important of these elements are analyzed in the fol134. See Memorandum from Jacobs Wind Electric Company to Minnesota Public
Utilities Commission (Sept. 30, 1983) (on file at the William Mitchell Law Review Office).
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lowing discussion. As examples of two existing standard contracts,
the uniform statewide contract for small power producers under
forty kilowatts capacity proposed by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, and the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's
of 100 kiloStandard Offer Number 3 for purchases from facilities
135
B.
and
A
Appendices
in
forth
set
are
less
watts or
The most important element of the contract from the standpoint of the small power producer is the purchase price provision.
This element dictates the economic feasibility of the project. The
utility is required to pay a price based on its avoided costs for
power generated by small producers. 136 This price, derived from
the utility's avoided cost, will have an avoided energy cost component and an avoided capacity cost component.
From the utility's perspective, the length of the contract is not as
critical for producers under 100 kilowatt capacity as it is for small
power producers of greater capacity. The utility will calculate the
impact of small generators under 100 kilowatt capacity or the utility's long-term capacity needs in a manner very similar to its calculation of the impact of decisions by thousands of small customers
on its load requirements. 37 When dealing with large numbers of
small producers or customers, each of which individually has a
very small impact on capacity or load, the utility will utilize probabilistic, statistical estimates of their behavior. Larger producers,
for example, those above ten megawatts in capacity, will be very
few in number within any utility system and will have a significant
individual impact on utility capacity planning. Such entities must
commit to long-term contracts to justify full capacity credits.
The contract term and the stability of the purchase price over
that term will be an important factor if the small power producer
seeks financing for the project. The contract term should be, at a
minimum, adequate to cover the term of the permanent
financing.'

38

The allocation of the costs of interconnection should not be a
significant contract issue. In most states, the small power producer
is responsible for all reasonable additional costs of interconnection
135. See Appendix A, Pacific Gas and Electric Company Standard Offer #3 (1984)
(reproduced infra as Appendix B) [hereinafter cited as Appendix B].
136. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
137. See P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 5, at 37-39 (discussion of how
utilities accommodate residential customer load fluctuations).
138. Address by Ken Lever, President of Actaeon Corp., A Conference On Public Policy Issues On Cogeneration And Small Power Production (July 19, 1984).
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in excess of those required for a standard meter to customers of the
utility.

39

The most reasonable alternative for the reimbursement

of these costs to the utility is to require the small power producer
to pay the interconnection costs in a lump sum within a few
months of the interconnection. These are costs of the project similar to the cost of the generation equipment itself and should be
borne by the small producer. There is no economic reason to require the utility to finance these costs and amortize them through
bills to the small producer over some period. If the utility is required to finance these costs, the small producer must be required
to pay a current market rate of interest on the financing.
Liability concerns the responsibilities of the small producer and
the utility for damages resulting from the operation of facilities or
the actions of employees. The most sensible approach is to make
each party to the contract responsible for the activities of its personnel and the operation of its facilities. The utility, in particular,
should be responsible for its employees' safety when they are working on the premises of the small power producer.
The contract should require the small power producer to take
out liability insurance in a reasonable amount. In Minnesota, this
is specified as $300,000 for facilities with a capacity under forty
kilowatts. 40 In California, the standard contract requires
$100,000 coverage if the facility has a capacity less than twenty
kilowatts and $500,000 if the facility has a capacity between
twenty and 100 kilowatts. 1 4 ' Insofar as possible, the liability insurance requirements should conform to standard insurance industry
practices so that the coverage can be added to a rural residential
or farm homeowner's policy without an individual negotiation.
For example, if requiring the utility to be a named insured is not
standard practice and will require individualized negotiation, potential buyers will be deterred by the difficulty and expense of se2

curing insurance. 14

Access to the small power facility by the utility should be necessary only if the configuration of the facility does not permit the
utility to disconnect or test the facility from the utility's side of the
139. See RESOURCE DYNAMICS CORP., supra note 2, at 30 (payment for interconnection
cost varies widely from state to state).
140. See Appendix A, 1112.
141. See Appendix B, 15.
142. See Memorandum, supra note 134.
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445

interconnection. If utility access is necessary, then the contract
should provide the utility with reasonable access.
For generators smaller than 100 kilowatts in capacity, the costs
of a contractual provision to require wheeling seem to outweigh
the benefits. For larger facilities, however, the contract must provide that, in the event the QF desires to do so, the contracting
utility must wheel power at FERC rates. 143 Power will thus flow
to the utility which needs it most.
The contract must also provide for the conditions under which
the utility may interrupt the provision of power to the facility or
the purchase of power from the facility. Any system emergency
which normally justifies the interruption of service to other customers should be adequate basis for interruption of service to a
small power producer as long as the utility does not discriminate
against the small power producer in interrupting service or resuming electrical service. 144 The contract should also permit the utility
to interrupt the purchase of power when necessary in order to improve or maintain the utility's system 145 or in the case of a system
emergency. 146 With the exception of system emergencies, the utility should give reasonable notice of the interruption in the
purchase of power.
A penalty clause for nonperformance of a long-term contract is
not appropriate for small producers with a capacity under 100
kilowatts. With larger facilities, the utility will have adjusted its
capacity planning in anticipation of the long-term commitment of
capacity by the larger facility. Nonperformance at a future date
will force the utility to replace that capacity with other more expensive capacity. As noted earlier, the utility will use probabilistic
statistical models to predict the available capacity of large numbers of diversified small power producers. As with residential consumers and residential load characteristics, it is the large number
statistical characteristics which are important in the utility's planning, not the individual determinations to commence or terminate
the production of power. Therefore, penalty clauses for nonperformance of long-term contracts by very small producers are not
sound policy.
143. FERC has ruled that states may not set rates for wheeling power, but has not
ruled on whether a state may require wheeling. See States Cannot Set Rates For Wheeling
Small Power Production, FERC Rules, ELECTRIC WORLD, Oct. 29, 1984, at 1.
144. See Appendix A, 10.
145. See id, 11.
146. See Appendix B, I 8(b).
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The contract should provide that the parties may bring a dispute before the Public Utilities Commission for resolution. Because of the extreme disparities in financial resources available to
the utility in contrast to the small power producer with a capacity
under 100 kilowatts, it is possible that utilities could tie up disputes
in litigation for long periods of time, thus creating an additional
entry barrier for small facilities. This disparity in resources can be
addressed partially by allowing the small facility to recover attorneys' fees if it prevails in the dispute. In Minnesota, the Commission is empowered by statute with discretionary authority to
award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 47 The Commission
may award attorneys' fees against the small power producer only if
the "claims of the qualifying facility . . . have been made in bad
faith, or are a sham, or frivolous."1 48 This recitation in the standard contract will effectively inform the parties of their rights in
the event of a dispute.
Part II of the uniform contract deals with the technical relationships of the QF with the utility. The contractual requirement that
the small power producer meet the requirements of the utilities
commission and the applicable laws and codes, including national,
state, and local electric and safety codes, is straightforward.
The second requirement is that the small producer meet specified technical requirements for the interconnection and operation
of the facility. It is critical that these technical requirements be
specified uniformly for all the utilities in the state, to the maximum degree possible, in order to reduce the potential use of these
requirements by the utilities to increase entry barriers. Transaction costs for the small producer will be increased substantially if it
must employ experts to review technical issues. To keep the principal provisions of the uniform contract simple and understandable, these technical issues are best addressed in an appendix to the
uniform contract. A suggested appendix to the contract is included as Appendix C of this article. 149
The uniform statewide contract proposed above directly addresses the various contracting problems. It will prevent abuse of
utility monopsony power and advantages in negotiation. Above
all, it is simple and understandable, to the advantage of potential
producers of this type of generation. The small power producer
147. See MINN. STAT. § 216B. 164, subd. 5 (Supp. 1983).
148. See i.
149. See Appendix C.
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must only fill in the purchase price, the manner of payment, and
the term of the contract.
IV.

AVOIDED COSTS

The standard contract describes the rights and obligations of the
parties, including the price to be paid for energy generated by a
small power producer. The FERC rules require a standard price
to be put into effect with respect to each electric utility for small
power producers with capacities of 100 kilowatts or less.' 50 The
standard price must be set within the guidelines established by
FERC.151
In 1980, FERC promulgated rules interpreting the language of
section 210 of PURPA's title II requiring that utilities purchase
power from small power facilities at a rate which does not exceed
52
the incremental cost to the utility of alternative electric energy.'
FERC interprets "incremental cost" in terms of an avoided cost
criterion, defined in the regulations as the "incremental costs to an
electric utility of electric energy or capacity or both which, but for
the purchase from the qualifying facility or qualifying facilities,
such utility would generate itself or purchase from another
source." 153
The FERC rules were designed as guidelines and leave many of
the details of implementation to the states. 154 The rules identify
various cost factors to be considered in the determination of the
energy component and the capacity component of avoided cost
but provide little specific direction on how either is to be
calculated. '55
The states responded to this general directive by adopting one of
three approaches. One group of states adopted only the FERC
rules, essentially granting broad discretion in determining avoided
150. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(c) (1984).
151. Id § 292.304(c)(3)(i).
152. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(d) (1982).
153. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6).
154. See id. § 292.401(a). FERC emphasized in the rulemaking that it was attempting
"to evolve concepts in a newly developing area," and that it was leaving state commissions
"flexibility for experimentation and accommodation of special circumstances." 45 Fed.
Reg. 12,226 (1980). FERC offered to approve any method which reasonably accounts for
the utility's avoided cost and provides the required encouragement for qualifying facilities.
Id
155. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e). This section reads:
(e) Faclors aercting ratesfor purchases. In determining avoided costs, the following
factors shall, to the extent practicable, be taken into account:
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56

A second group of states included requirements additional to the FERC rules which further direct the utilities in their calculation of avoided cost. 15 7 A third group
developed very specific methodologies to be applied by the utilities
in estimating their avoided cost. 158
State commissions should specify the methodology to be used in
determining the price to be paid by a utility for energy supplied by
small power producers. This buy-back specification is necessary
for the same reasons of utility monopsony power, information and
transaction cost advantages, and resource advantages that underlie the need for a uniform standard contract. These problems are
particularly severe for very small producers under 100 kilowatt capacity, but will also be significant for larger facilities.
There are a variety of methods which have been proposed to
calculate avoided cost. The capacity component in particular can
be estimated by several alternative methods. 159 The focus of this
section is on the principles which must guide the selection of an
avoided cost methodology. Economics again provides important
tools useful in framing these guidelines. This section examines several practical considerations which must be addressed in setting a
standard rate and then analyzes the principles underlying an acceptable avoided cost methodology. These principles also apply to
facilities with capacity over 100 kilowatts. Some states that issued
utility.

(1) The data provided pursuant to § 292.302(b), (c), or (d), including State
review of any such data;
(2) The availability of capacity or energy from a qualifying facility during
the system daily and seasonal peak periods, including:
(i) The ability of the utility to dispatch the qualifying facility;
(ii) The expected or demonstrated reliability of the qualifying facility;
(iii) The terms of any contract or other legally enforceable obligation, termination notice requirement and sanctions for non-compliance;
(iv) The extent to which scheduled outages of the qualifying facility can be
usefully coordinated with scheduled outages of the utility's facilities;
(v) The usefulness of energy and capacity supplied from a qualifying facility
during system emergencies, including its ability to separate its load from its generation;
(vi) The individual and aggregate value of energy and capacity from qualifying facilities on the electric utility's system; and
(vii) The smaller capacity increments and the shorter lead times available
with additions of capacity from qualifying facilities . ...
Id
156.

RESOURCE DYNAMICS CORP., supra note 2, at 13.

157. Id.
158. Id
159. See id. at 22-27; Yokell & Marcus, Rate Makingfor Sales of Power To Electric Utilies,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2, 1984, at 22-23 (discussing differential review requirements
method and proxy unit approach).
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or were near issuing final orders by April 1983 had, in fact, required utilities to issue standard rates for small producers with capacities of more than 100 kilowatts.16°
Two practical considerations must be addressed in setting a
standard avoided cost rate. First, the price must be understandable to potential investors in these technologies. The data used in
the avoided cost calculation must be readily available so that small
power producers can monitor utility compliance. As discussed in
the previous section, the size of the small power producer's investment is not sufficient to justify expert consultants to negotiate
price or monitor utility performance. In addition, rural homeowners and farmers, the most likely investors in small power facilities
under 100 kilowatts in capacity, are self reliant and often share a
populist distrust of utilities. Complexity in price will be a signifi61
cant deterrent to their investment.1
Second, the price must be set with sufficient certainty over a
long enough term so that investors can secure financing for small
power projects. Lenders want as much certainty as possible that
the anticipated revenues from a project will be sufficient to pay off
the loan. 162 This means that there must be a long-term, fixed price
option in the standard contract. 63 The concern that a utilities
commission may later find a long-term fixed price set by contract
to be imprudent seems remote, since the commission at an earlier
point will have approved the standard avoided cost rate to be used
in the contract.
Beyond these practical considerations, there are several fundamental principles which should guide the selection of an avoided
cost methodology. The proper starting point to develop these
principles is the division of avoided cost into its major components.
The energy component and the capacity component are specifically mentioned in the FERC rules.' 64 These are defined below. A
third component mentioned in the FERC rules is the avoided environmental and societal costs. These include the avoided cost at160. See RESOURCE DYNAMICS CORP., supra note 2, at 12. Note that 18 C.F.R.
§ 292.304(c)(2) permits state commissions to require standard rates for purchases from
QFs larger than 100 kW.
161. Cf RESOURCE DYNAMICS CORP., supra note 2, at 20 (simplicity in understanding
is a ratemaking consideration).
162. Address by Martin Cooney, Vice President, First Bank Minneapolis, A Conference On Public Policy Issues On Cogeneration And Small Power Production (July 18,
1984); see Smartt, supra note 5, at 8; Yokell & Marcus, supra note 159, at 22.
163. F. SISSINE, supra note 20, at 43.
164. 18 C.F.R. §§ 2 9 2 .304(e), 292.302(b).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985

29

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 5
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I11

tributable to the reduction of fossil fuel use 16 5 and to the smaller
capacity increments and shorter lead times when adding capacity
by small power producers. 166 The environmental costs of fossil fuels and the costs to society of the loss of responsiveness to changing
demand inherent in the long construction times for fossil fuel
plants are largely not internalized 1 7 by the utilities. However,
they must be addressed in an avoided cost rate.
A.

The Energy Component

The energy component is the simplest to determine. Fuel and
variable operations and maintenance cost savings are obtained
when the utility reduces the operating level of any oil, gas, coal, or
nuclear plant in response to a reduced load induced by the presence of a small power producer on the utility system.' 68 The value
of the fuel and operations and maintenance costs that are saved
will depend on the particular generator that is backed down to a
lower operating level and the unit value of fuel at that time. The
equipment mix of a utility may change from year to year and thus
169
the fuel savings will vary with the equipment mix.

B.

The Capacity Component

The capacity component of a utility's avoided cost attributable
to delivery of energy by small power producers is a function of
(1) whether the utility has current or anticipated unmet demand
for capacity in its service area, and (2) whether the power provided
by the small power facility has sufficiently firm characteristics to
permit the utility to defer or cancel additional generating capacity
165. Id. § 292.304(e)(3).
166. Id. § 292.304(e)(2)(vii).
167. Uninternalized costs "represent sources of social gain or loss that do not get translated into market signals." J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 449
(1976).
168. RESOURCE DYNAMICS CORP., supra note 2, at 4 ("The energy component represents the direct production costs per kilowatthour [sic] the utility no longer incurs if its
generation requirements are reduced; it is based primarily on fuel costs"); Yokell & Marcus, supra note 159, at 24 (fuel and variable operating costs are assignable to the energy
component).
169. The avoided operating costs in cents per kilowatt hour for each generating unit
are routinely calculated by a generating utility for the purpose of the most economic dispatch of its units. This is called a system lambda. An acceptable measure of the utility's
avoided energy costs can be computed for any time period by taking the average of the
system lambdas for the period. NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, MARGINAL COST RATEMAKING 29 (1981).
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in the long run 170 or to build smaller, less expensive generating
units. 17' This includes a change in the mix of generation plants
needed by the utility given the contribution of a small power facility. If a utility is able to avoid the expensive capacity costs of a
baseload plant 172 and can rely on less expensive peaking plants 173
because of the power supply characteristics of a small power producer, the avoided costs of the utility are the capacity cost savings
less the higher energy costs of the peaking plant. Firmness is associated with the continuity and average level of power with which a
174
small power facility can be expected to produce.
FERC recognized from the outset that "the translation of the
principle of avoided capacity costs from theory into practice is an
extremely difficult exercise, and is one which, by definition, is
based on estimation and forecasting of future [capacity requirements]." 175 A 1983 study indicates the problematic and controversial nature of the avoided capacity costs determination. 176 The
study found that twenty states had not yet required or recom1 77
mended a specific method for calculating avoided capacity cost.

The utilities' principal estimation difficulties concern first, the
technical uncertainty involved with some small power technologies
and second, the planning uncertainty involved with small power
technologies. Using wind energy as an example, the utilities point
to the intermittent nature of wind resources and the consequent
inconsistency of an individual generator's output.

78

The utilities

also point to the limited performance and reliability data on wind
energy systems and the lack of dispatchability.179 However, some
170.

Set id. at 25; RESOURCE DYNAMICS CORP., supra note 2, at 21.

171. See F. SISSINE, supra note 20, at 7.
172. A baseload plant is generally "supplied by the cheapest energy sources-coal,
nuclear, and possibly hydroelectric" and operates 24 hours each day. M. RICE, AN ANALYSIS OF'PURPA AND SOLAR ENERGY 26 (SERI/TR-434-484 1980).
173. Peaking service is used only during high demand times. "Peaking generation
often uses relatively small combustion turbines, which are quickly brought on-line but
burn expensive fuel with low efficiency." Id
174. See F. SISSINE, supra note 20, at 17.
175. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,226 (1980).
176. F. SISSINE, supra note 20.
177. Id at 14, 37.
178. Id at 12. The variable output may create potential for added utility costs associated with system operating requirements. But "all generating technologies--coal, nuclear, wind, etc.-have periods (forced outages) during which they are taken out of service
for maintenance and repair. These technologies also have varying reliability, but the degree of variation and reasons for it differ with [the] technology." Id.at 12 n.18.
179. Dispatchability is defined as the capability of producing power on demand. Id at
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small power technologies, hydroelectric power and cogeneration,
for example, have long histories and do not pose these technologi18 0
cal uncertainties.
Utilities also point to planning uncertainties associated with all
small power technologies. Because utilities cannot control the
market forces that influence the costs of small power generation
facilities or the availability of financing for these facilities, it is difficult to estimate their potential effect on the need for the utility to
build additional generating capacity.18 1 Uncertainty over current
excess capacity and forecasting the course of future demand
8
growth are also problems.

2

Several propositions are useful in guiding utilities commissions'
consideration of these issues of uncertainty in the determination of
the avoided capacity component. First, if the only concern were to
establish a price which would be exactly equal to the full avoided
cost experienced by a given utility, precise information regarding
small power technologies, future demand growth, and future generating plants would be necessary. Congress and a number of state
legislatures, however, intend to encourage the development of
small power production facilities because, in their view, delay is
not in the public interest.18 3 The utilities commissions should use
their expert judgment to make reasoned estimations and forecasts
on the data available and not await exact information.
A second general proposition is that the capacity planning
model of the utility itself cannot be the standard by which the
avoided capacity component is determined. Market failure conditions18 4 may lead a utility toward a self-fulfilling prophesy: because the capacity contribution of small producers is so small, the
utility does not include it in the planning horizon, and it therefore,
in the utilities' view, deserves no capacity credit. Again, the commissions must use expert judgment to make reasoned estimations
18 5
of the long-term penetration of small power technologies.
A third proposition to address the uncertainty issues is that the
180. Address by Dr. Roger Arendt, St. Anthony Falls Hydraulic Laboratory, A Conference On Public Policy Issues On Cogeneration And Small Power Production (July 19,
1984).
181. F. SISSINE, surpra note 20, at 12-13.
182. Id
183. See supra notes 26-89 and accompanying text (discussion of legislative purpose of
federal and Minnesota legislation).
184. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
185. See Yokell & Marcus, supra note 159, at 25.
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utility commissions must take a long-run view of load growth in
assessing the avoided capacity component. Utilities go through
phases of both under and over capacity.8 6 These phases occur for
two reasons. First, utilities add capacity in very large lumps
through the addition of new baseload plants."8 7 Second, the rate
of demand growth for electricity fluctuates but the lead time for
the construction of a baseload plant is eight to fourteen years.'a 8
Thus, whenever a baseload plant is added, the utility may have
excess capacity for several years while load growth catches up to
the new capacity. If the planning and construction of a new plant
coincides with unexpected decreases in the rate of demand growth
for electricity, then the excess capacity situation is exacerbated. 18 9
Some utilities have successfully argued that they need not develop an avoided capacity component while there exists excess capacity.' 90 This approach is unsound since excess capacity is a
short-run condition and eventually load growth will create a need
for additional capacity. Small power producers, however, seek
long-term contracts on which investment decisions and financing
are based. Utilities also seek twenty-five to thirty-year contracts
for larger projects so that the utility can plan capacity requirements. ,9' The future contributions of small power to delaying new
generating plants or less costly new plants must be recognized in
the avoided cost component.
The key question then is not whether the utility presently plans
to build capacity but whether there are anticipated future increases in demand. There will be a need for substantial additional
generating capacity to be built before the year 2000.192 There are
signs that with the continuing growth of the economy, and electricity's improved price position relative to other energy sources,
the utilities may be entering a period of high rates of growth in
186. F. SISSINE, supra note 20, at 41.
187. Id
188. Id.
189. This is what has happened to many utilities since the late 1960's. In the 1960's,
utility powerplant construction lagged behind rapidly increasing demand. However, the
rate of demand growth dropped sharply during the 1970's, falling behind the rate of plant
construction. In the 1970's, the construction rate also declined, but exceeded demand
growth by a consistently wide margin. Many utilities therefore installed generating capability in excess of their requirements by the 1980's. Id.
190. Id
191. Comments of Peter Brown, Energy Law Institute, A Conference On Public Policy
Issues On Cogeneration And Small Power Production (July 19, 1984).
192. Id
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demand for electricity. 93 This growth would translate into a
surge of orders for baseload plants in the late 1980's. 194
1. Capaciy Factors and Aggregation
In addition to the uncertainty issues discussed above, the utilities have pointed out that some small power technologies do not
provide firm power and therefore should not receive any avoided
capacity component. This argument is directed particularly at
wind, hydro, and solar technologies. The thrust of the argument is
that capacity credits should be determined on an individual facility basis. Under this approach, a firm capacity credit is determined for each facility based on the capacity factor.195 Utilities
and commissions have usually adopted the position that an individual facility is eligible for an avoided capacity credit only if its
96
capacity factor exceeds seventy to eighty percent.
Even with an adjustment of the capacity factor criterion, commissions adopting this approach are ignoring the FERC regulations' specific direction to consider the "individual and aggregate
value of energy and capacity from qualifying facilities on the electric utility's system.' 1 97 While it may be true that only a few locations exist where an individual wind energy system can produce
power at its rated capacity seventy to eighty percent of the time, a
group of wind systems at dispersed locations in different wind regimes is more likely to produce a more continuous and predictable
193. See Siegel & Sillin, Rethinking Strategy Under Condtlzans of/Hgh Growth, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Sept. 3, 1984, at 19.
194. See Future Plants.- What Kind Will They Be?, ELECTRIC WORLD, July 1984, at 20

(the dependent factors of such an increase include sustained increase in demand and economic growth, allowance of adequate rate increases, economically healthy utilities, and a
lessened emphasis on conservation).

But see Naill & Sant, Electrity Markets in the 1990's

Feast or Famine?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 26, 1984, at 23 (new capacity additions may not
be needed after the year 2000).
195. F. SISSINE, supra note 20, at 17. "A facility's capacity factor is defined as the ratio
of its annual energy output in [kilowatt hours] to the product of its rated capacity in

kilowatts and the total number of hours in one year." Thus, if a facility produces at a
consistent level of power output at or near its capacity over a substantial portion of the

year, the capacity factor will be high. Id
196. Id at 17-18. Few locations exist where a single windfarm can be expected to
produce power at its rated capacity for 70% to 80% of the time. Id.
The capacity factor criterion of 70% to 80% is unreasonably high since nuclear reactors have been operating with capacity factors between 42.2% and 83% with a national
average between 55% and 59% for the past five years. See Nuclear Runnng Costs Take a Big
Bite, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1984, at 6E, col. 3. A capacity factor of 60% is acceptable in
the industry. See Regulators Get Education on Reliability, ELECTRIC WORLD, Nov. 1983, at 21.

197.

18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(2)(vi) (1984).
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level of output. 198 In addition, for some utilities, including rural
utilities in the upper midwest, a large part of the load is for space
heating. This weather-sensitive peak load correlates highly with
wind energy availability in the region, thus providing significant
power at the system peak.199
The aggregation principle logically should be carried to the next
step: when the output of dispersed wind energy systems is combined with the power produced by cogeneration and other small
power technologies, the result may be an even more predictable
and continuous level of output. 20 0 If there exists a large number of
small power facilities of a roughly similar size, they will produce
predictable patterns of daily and seasonal power output. This cumulative stability of supply is very much like the aggregation of
rather unpredictable consumers of electricity (residential, commercial, and industrial ratepayers) which creates a sufficiently stable
daily and seasonal pattern of demand that a utility can predict its
20 I
load curve
As of 1984, over twenty states have established capacity payment schemes20 2 but only three states, California, Montana, and
North Carolina, have accepted the aggregation principle and require utilities to make aggregate capacity payments to all small
power producers. 20 3 This failure to include aggregation is unwarranted. The necessary statistical methodologies are available and
198. See F. SISSINE, supra note 20, at 18-21; M. RICE, supra note 172, at 17.
Some commissions have adopted firm capacity performance standards which are directed solely toward the peak period availability of the small power facility and which
require an average peak period availability at least equal to that of a utility's peaking
plant. See Cogeneration Rates: The Present and Future of Full Avoided Costs, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
May 10, 1984, at 55, 57 [hereinafter cited as Cogeneration Rates]. This approach ignores the
fact that an aggregation of small power facilities can supply a level of firm power equal in
performance to many baseload plants. A capacity credit must recognize that costs are
avoided when capital intensive baseload plants can be delayed or replaced by less capital
intensive intermediate or peaking plants.
199. C. DEWINKEL, supra note 13, at 53-54, 108. The availability of wind power at
peak power demand times may result in avoided costs of a peaking plant.
The aggregate capacity impact of commitments by dispersed wind energy systems
can be computed through statistical models. See NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE APPROPRIATENESS AND FEASIBILITY OF VARIOUS METHODS OF CALCU-

32-33, 45; F. SISSINE, supra note 20, at 18-21. Whatever model is
used, it must consider that the aggregate effect of wind energy does contribute to system
reliability and thus justifies some capacity credit. Id. at 26.
200. F. SISSINE, supra note 20, at 18.
201. Id at 18-21.
202. Id. at 42.
203. Id. at 43.
LATING AVOIDED COSTS
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nearly every state has significant potential for cogeneration and
solid waste and most have significant potential for solar and wind
energy. 2 4 At the minimum, states should consider an interim approach. They should adopt an avoided cost component for all
small power technologies under 100 kilowatt capacity based on the
aggregation scheme used by California, Montana, or North Caro20 5
lina until they develop a superior methodology.
The aggregation principle also supports the proposition that
utility commissions take a pool-wide or statewide approach to the
measurement of the avoided capacity component. The case for
aggregate credits is strongest when the service area is larger to accommodate a wider dispersion of wind systems and a more diverse
mix of small power technologies. Although, for example, wind regimes may be most favorable in one part of a state, the development of the resource benefits all the citizens of the state. This
benefit to all citizens will not be achieved if the aggregate avoided
capacity component is calculated on a utility-by-utility basis
20 6
where some utilities have small franchise areas.
A logically related step is the adoption of a single statewide
avoided cost rate including both energy and capacity components
as well as the environmental component for small power producers
rather than a utility specific avoided cost rate. The Iowa Commerce Commission set a single statewide rate "in recognition of the
circumstances surrounding electric utilities today, including widespread interconnection, joint dispatch facilities, and joint investment in generating capacity. ' '20 7 A few other states have utilized
power pool considerations in setting the avoided capacity
20 8
component.
2. Levelization
A final principle for commissions to consider in the determina204. Id at 47 n.82.
205. Id. at 49.
206. Address by Leo Adams, Chairperson, Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, A
Conference On Public Policy Issues On Cogeneration And Small Power Production (July
20, 1984).
207. Iowa Commerce Commission, Order Adopting Rules, July 27, 1984, at 3.
208. Wisconsin calculates avoided costs and buy-back rates on a pool-wide basis. Wsconsin Estabh'shes Avoided Capacity Cost Credit, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 18, 1983, at 59. Florida and Minnesota have linked power pool considerations with the reference unit method
of calculating avoided capacity costs. F. SISSINE, supra note 20, at 38-39.
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tion of the avoided cost component is the levelization 20 9 of the utilities' avoided capacity costs over the term of the contract. This
approach should be used rather than a variable capacity cost component which would provide capacity cost payments only during
that period of the contract term when the utility is actually deferring the construction of capacity or building a less costly new
20
plant. '
A levelized avoided capacity cost component provides significant encouragement to small power production. The Iowa Commerce Commission pointed out, "This feature more nearly
matches the capital requirements of the typical [small power producer], which may well experience the greatest demands for interest and principal payments in its early years." 2' I The levelization
of the avoided capacity component will thus reduce the risk premium for investors and potential lenders.
The denial of capacity credits during periods of excess capacity
creates an on-and-off cycle of purchased power prices that give incorrect market signals for long-run capacity planning. The pattern of denying capacity credits for several years of excess capacity
after a new baseload plant is constructed, and then granting them
a few years before the next baseload plant is built, will alter small
power investment. 21 2 The utilities argue for no avoided capacity
cost component because they have no need for small power during
the years when they are overbuilt with projects. But the utilities
then argue that they must go forward with their own additional
projects because there is not a sufficient amount of small power
being generated. This situation is a catch-22 for the small power
21 3
producer.
The principal argument against the levelization of the avoided
capacity component is that present ratepayers will pay a higher
rate for capacity costs which are not yet avoided so that future
209. Levelization is the cost of future capacity, discounted back to present value, averaged over the years of the contract.
210. A variable capacity cost component would probably start fairly low and escalate
at the time the utility starts deferring the continuation of capacity or building less costly
new capacity. A levelized rate will reflect the net present value of the future avoided costs
allocated so that a single stable rate applies to the entire term of the contract. See generall
Yokell & Marcus, supra note 159, at 25 (discussion of discount rates).
211. Iowa Commerce Commission, supra note 207, at 4.
212. See F. SISSINE, supra note 20, at 46 n.77 (recommending fixed credit over a capacity planning period equal to the life cycle of a powerplant to create a more accurate longterm signal).
213. See Cogeneration Rates, supra note 198, at 57.
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ratepayers can benefit from today's investment in small power. 2 14
That many states currently allow Construction Work In Progress
(CWIP)215 into rate base is inconsistent with their denial of a

levelized avoided capacity cost component. The allowance of
CWIP is essentially the same as providing capacity credits for unfinished conventional plants.

2

16

The principal justifications for al-

lowing CWIP into rate base are that the utilities will otherwise
experience cash flow problems and that to some significant degree,
it is present ratepayers who are demanding more energy which the
new plant must provide. The same arguments apply to the levelizing of the capacity credit for small power facilities. As the Iowa
Commerce Commission noted, levelizing the rate "has the added
benefit of contributing to retail rate stability. ' ' 21 7 Levelizing the

avoided capacity component will help prevent the rate shock
which occurs when a new baseload plant is put into rate base.
The purpose of PURPA and state legislation on small power is
the encouragement of these technologies. A levelized avoided capacity cost component is an effective and fair means to carry out
this purpose. Two recent state court decisions have held statemandated minimum purchase rates invalid on federal preemption
grounds. 21 8 These decisions create uncertainty concerning a
levelized avoided capacity cost component insofar as a levelized
rate may exceed the federal rate of avoided cost set by FERC in
the early years of the contract. 21 9 Section 210 of PURPA provides
that the rate established by FERC for the purchase of electrical
energy from a QF must not exceed the incremental cost to the
electric utility of alternative electric energy. 220 Incremental cost is
214. Bruce, Two Further Looks at Small Power Production, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 13,
1984, at 50.
215. See F. SISSINE, supra note 20, at 46-47.
216. Id.at 47.
217. Iowa Commerce Commission, supra note 207, at 4.
218. See Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 234 Kan. 1052, 676
P.2d 764 (1984); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 98 A.D.2d 377, 471
N.Y.S.2d 684 (1983).
The New York Court of Appeals recently reversed the lower court decision in Consolidated Edison Co. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 53 U.S.L.W. 2251
(N.Y. 1984). The court of appeals held that the federal rate was not intended to be an
absolute price ceiling. Therefore, although the New York rate may not achieve consumer
savings, it still furthers the objective of PURPA to encourage alternative energy production. Id; see infa notes 230-37 and accompanying text (discussion of the erroneous rationale of the Kansas and lower New York courts).
219. See Kansas City Power &Light, 234 Kan. at -, 676 P.2d at 768; ConsohdatedEdison
Co., 98 A.D.2d at 382-85, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 688-90.
220. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (1982).
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defined as the cost to the utility of electric energy which, but for its
purchase from a federal QF, the utility would generate or
purchase from another source. 22' The FERC rules set the rate for
22 2
the purchase of electricity from QFs at the avoided cost.

The New York Supreme Court reviewed these elements of
PURPA and the FERC rules relevant to price and noted that the
Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference on
PURPA stated that, "This [avoided cost] limitation . . .is meant

to act as an upper limit on the price at which utilities can be required under this section to purchase electric energy.

' 223

Thus,

Congress did not intend states to establish rates in excess of the
federal rate of avoided cost. The New York court found additional
support in American PaperInstitute, Inc. v. American Electric Power Service Corp.,224 the recent Supreme Court decision upholding the
FERC regulations. In American Paper Institute, the Supreme Court

interpreted the section 210 clause requiring rates "just and reasonable to the electric consumers," as requiring consideration of rate
savings for consumers. 225 The New York court concluded, therefore, that such savings would be impossible if states could establish
rates in excess of avoided cost. 226 The court held that FERC's in-

dication that states could prescribe purchase rates higher than
avoided cost 227 was contrary to the legislative purpose of Congress
in enacting PURPA. 228 The Kansas Supreme Court came to a
similar conclusion.

229

These decisions leave in doubt the validity of an avoided capac221. Id.§ 824a-3(d).
222. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2) (1984).
223. ConsolidatedEdson, 98 A.D.2d at 383, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 689 (quoting H. CON. REP.
No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 98, reprintedth 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7797,
7832).
224. 461 U.S. 402 (1983).
225. Id at 415 n.9.
226. ConsohdatedEdson, 98 A.D.2d at 383-85, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
227. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,221 (1980). The FERC rules state that:
If a State program were to provide that electric utilities must purchase power
from certain types of facilities . . .at a higher rate than that provided by these
rules, a qualifying facility may seek to obtain the benefits of that State program.
In such a case, however, the higher rates would be based on State authority to
establish such rates and not on the Commission's rules.
Id.
228. 98 A.D.2d at 383-84, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
229. Accord Kansas City Power & Light, 234 Kan. at -, 676 P.2d at 768. The Kansas
Supreme Court, relying on Consolidated Edison, stated that "PURPA and the federal regulations have preempted the area of cogeneration and . . . [state] rules and regulations
cannot lawfully require public utilities to purchase electricity at a rate greater than a rate
based on avoided cost." Id
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ity cost component which is levelized. It also appears to preclude
an avoided capacity cost component which recognizes environmental or other costs not currently internalized by the utilities.
These two state court decisions are wrongly decided and can be
distinquished. It is not clear that the Supreme Court intended in
American PaperInstitute to prohibit either levelized rates or the consideration of environmental and other intangible costs in setting
capacity components. 230 The Court recognized that "[t]he basic
purpose of § 210 of PURPA was to increase the utilization of
cogeneration and small power production facilities and to reduce
reliance on fossil fuels."12 3' In a footnote, the Court interpreted the
"just and reasonable" language of section 210(b) as requiring
"consideration of potential rate savings for electric utility consumers." '2 32 In that footnote, the Court discussed the merits of less
than full avoided cost rates, rather than the issues presented by a
purchase rate greater than avoided costs. 233 American PaperInstitute,
therefore, requires only the considerationof potential rate savings to
234
consumers.
FERC's interpretation of PURPA to permit states to prescribe
rates higher than avoided cost is a reasonable interpretation of
PURPA in light of the basic purpose of PURPA to encourage
small power production, and not the reduction of rates for utility
consumers. 2 35 Where FERC has carefully considered the conflicting policy choices of rate savings to consumers and encouragement
of small power production, and has made a reasonable statutory
interpretation, courts should defer to the agency's
236
interpretation.
230. 402 U.S. at 416.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 415 n.9.
233. Id.
234. Id The Court stated that "Unless the 'just and reasonable' language is to be
regarded as mere surplusage, it must be interpreted to mandate consideration of rate savings for consumers that could be produced by setting the rate at a lower level than the
statutory ceiling." Id.
235. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,221. The Commission cautioned that the basic purpose of
PURPA of encouraging small power production "would be greatly hindered if it were to
require qualifying facilities to utilize section 210 . . . as the exclusive means of obtaining
interconnection." Id. The Commission concluded "that such a restrictive interpretation
of the law is not supportable." Id.
236. For cases discussing a court's scope of review in administrative appeals, see, e.g.,
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984);
Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 36-43
(1981); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
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A utilities commission may be able to distinguish the New York
and Kansas cases by carefully preparing a record. In both decisions, the courts noted that the utility commission conceded that
the ratepayers may have to pay more for electricity than avoided
CoSt. 237 While the avoided cost as determined by the commissions
may have exceeded the energy and capacity cost components
based on those costs which the utility is currently internalizing, the
commission may not have made a reasoned estimate of those
avoided costs to ratepayers and the society not presently internalized by the utilities.
C

The Externah'ty Component

Congress intended FERC and the states to consider the third
component, those costs not presently internalized by utilities, in
setting an avoided costs price. As the Supreme Court recognized
in American PaperInstitute, a basic purpose of PURPA is the reduc238
tion of reliance on fossil fuels by utilities in the United States.
This third component is mentioned in the FERC rules.2 39 FERC
directs the consideration of the avoided cost attributable to both
the reduction of fossil fuel use 240 and to the smaller capacity increments and shorter lead times made possible with the additions of
241
capacity by small power producers.
There are significant costs of fossil fuel use not presently internalized by the utilities using coal and nuclear generation which
would be avoided by the encouragement of small power production.2

42

There are environmental consequences for each small

237. Kansas Ciy Power &Light, 234 Kan. at __, 676 P.2d at 768; Consohdated Edison, 98
A.D.2d at 385, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
238. 402 U.S. at 417 (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 750).
239. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(c)(4).
240. Id. § 292.304(e)(3).
241. Id § 292.314(e)(2)(vii).
242. There is, for example, no land reclamation problem as in strip mining areas.
There are far fewer problems of air, water, and solid waste pollution associated with small
power production than with nuclear or coal baseplant generation. With wind and hydro
energy there are no sulfur dioxide emissions resulting in the problems of acid rain nor is
there thermal pollution resulting from condenser cooling. There is also no ash disposal or
nuclear waste disposal problem, and no possibility of large scale catastrophe as with nuclear plants. As small power facilities are built at the fingers of a utility system, there may
also be a decreased need for potentially hazardous and unsightly long distance high voltage lines.
For some states without fossil fuels, another unintentional cost of reliance on fossil
fuels is the flow of resources out of the state and the loss of potential employment opportunity in the state because energy must be purchased out of state by the utilities. Substitution of renewable flow resources for fossil fuels would make Minnesota less dependent on
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power technology that must also be answered, but they are gener24 3
ally far more benign that those of coal or nuclear generation.
There are also significant costs to ratepayers attributable to the
limited responsiveness to changing demand inherent in large
baseload capacity construction. This lack of responsiveness of nuclear and coal plants arises because technology, demand, and supply conditions change quite rapidly, whereas nuclear and coal
plants require eight to fourteen years to build. 24 4 Small generating
facilities, in contrast, have short lead times and can add capacity
to the system in small increments, thus more nearly matching capacity to need and avoiding the shock of the large rate increases
when baseload plants are brought on line. 245 Another cost to soci-

ety not internalized by utilities using oil and gas fuel generation is
the nation's continued reliance on undependable foreign sources of
oil and gas. Diversification of the energy system through small
power production will result in a more reliable energy system.
PURPA and state legislation direct utilities commissions to consider the costs not presently internalized by utilities but which
could be avoided by small power producton. The commissions
must identify and make a reasoned estimation of the costs attributable to the use of fossil fuels, including the costs to society of the
lack of responsiveness of large baseload plants to changing demand. Offset against this would be an estimate of the uninternalized environmental costs of small power production. Even if these
uninternalized costs to society cannot be precisely measured, their
energy imports. An active public policy to promote renewable energy technology would
create an important new industry and many jobs. See MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, 1982 Energy Policy and Conservation Report 3
(1982); Lancaster & Tarr, supra note 3, at 12-13.
243. For example, wind systems create some noise and visual pollution, and create
potential danger if the blade flies off or the support structure falls. However, studies dealing with the possible environmental consequences of wind energy systems development
support the contention that the environmental impact of wind use is minimal. The consensus of these reports is that:
(1) [wind systems] will impose only minor effects on the local environment;
(2) most potentially adverse impacts will be specific to each site; (3) the major
environmental concerns with siting large [wind systems] will be safety, electromagnetic interference, noise, and aesthetics; (4) in some cases, site location can
exacerbate or minimize a [wind system's] impact on the environment; and (5) in
most cases, potentially adverse impacts can be minimized or avoided by careful
planning, siting, and design.
NOUN, UTILITY SITING OF WECS: A PRELIMINARY LEGAL/REGULATORY ASSESSMENT,
17 (SERI/TR-744-778, May 1981).
244. See F. SISSINE, supra note 20, at 41; see also P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, supra
note 5, at 121.
245. See Huss, supra note 1, at 22.
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undoubted existence is reason for the utilities commission, at the
very least, to select the highest avoided cost rate from the range of
rates in which experts reasonably disagree.
V.

CONCLUSION

The current structure of federal and state statutes and regulations governing alternative energy sources opens the door to expanding small power production. But the great potential of
renewable energy sources is hindered by lingering institutional
barriers. Use of a uniform standard contract will check the monopsony power of the utility and equalize the bargaining positions
of utilities and small producers. By reducing transaction costs, the
uniform standard contract will encourage small power production.
A standard price should be established, based on the avoided costs
of energy and capacity demands, and environmental and social
costs. This, too, will promote small power production by adequately compensating the small producer but leaving the ratepayer indifferent to the source of generation. The net result will be
a more varied and dependable system of energy resources in the
near future.
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Appendix A
Uniform Contract as Required by
MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subd. 6 (Supp.
1983) and
MINN. R. § 7835.9910 (Supp. 1984)
PROPOSED RULES
UNIFORM STATEWIDE CONTRACT FOR COGENERATION AND SMALL POWER PRODUCTION FACILITIES
THIS CONTRACT is entered into
19,
by
(hereafter called "Utility") and

(hereafter called "QF").
RECITALS
The QF has installed electric generating facilities, consisting of
(Description of facilities), rated at less than 40 kilowatts of electricity, on property located at

The QF is prepared to generate electricity in parallel with the
Utility.
The QF's electric generating facilities meet the requirements of
the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (hereafter called
"Commission") rules on Cogeneration and Small Power Production and any technical standards for interconnection the Utility
has established that are authorized by those rules.
The Utility is obligated under federal and Minnesota law to interconnect with the QF and to purchase electricity offered for sale
by the QF.
A contract between the QF and the Utility is required by the
Commission's rules.
AGREEMENTS
The QF and the Utility agree:
1. The Utility will sell electricity to the QF under the rate
schedule in force for the class of customer to which the QF
belongs.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss2/5
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2.

The Utility will buy electricity from the QF under the current rate schedule filed with the Commission. The QF has
elected the rate schedule category hereinafter indicated (select one):
a. Net energy billing rate under part 7835.3300.
b. Simultaneous purchase and sale billing rate under part
7835.3400.
c. Time-of-day purchase rates under part 7835.3500.
A copy of the presently filed rate schedule is attached to this
contract.
3. The rates for sales and purchases of electricity may change
over the time this contract is in force, due to actions of the
Utility or of the Commission, and the QF and the Utility
agree that sales and purchases will be made under the rates
in effect each month during the time this contract is in force.
4. The Utility will compute the charges and payments for
purchases and sales for each billing period. Any net credit to
the QF will be made under one of the following options as
chosen by the QF:
1. Credit to the QF's account with the Utility.
2. Paid by check to the QF within 15 days of the billing
date.
5. The QF must operate its electric generating facilities within
any rules, regulations, and policies adopted by the Utility not
prohibited by the Commission's rules on Cogeneration and
Small Power Production which provide reasonable technical
connection and operating specifications for the QF. This
agreement does not waive the QF's right to bring a dispute
before the Commission as authorized by Minnesota Rules,
parts 7835.4800, 7835.5800, and 7835.4500, and any other
provision of the Commission's rules on Cogeneration and
Small Power Production authorizing Commission resolution
of a dispute.
6. The Utility's rules, regulations, and policies must conform to
the Commission's rules on Cogeneration and Small Power
Production.
7. The QF will operate its electric generating facilities so that
they conform to the national, state, and local electric and
safety codes, and will be responsible for the costs of
conformance.
8. The QF is responsible for the actual, reasonable costs of interPublished by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
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connection which are estimated to be $..
will pay the Utility in this way:

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

(Vol. I11

The QF

The QF will give the Utility reasonable access to its property
and electric generating facilities if the configuration of those
facilities does not permit disconnection or testing from the
Utility's side of the interconnection. If the Utility enters the
QF's property, the Utility will remain responsible for its
personnel.
The Utility may stop providing electricity to the QF during a
system emergency. The Utility will not discriminate against
the QF when it stops providing electricity or when it resumes
providing electricity.
The Utility may stop purchasing electricity from the QF
when necessary for the Utility to construct, install, maintain,
repair, replace, remove, investigate, or inspect any equipment or facilities within its electric system. The Utility will
notify the QF before it stops purchasing electricity in this
way:
The QF will keep in force liability insurance against personal
or property damage due to the installation, interconnection,
and operation of its electric generating facilities. The
(The utilamount of insurance coverage will be $.
ity may not require an amount greater than $300,000).
This contract becomes effective as soon as it is signed by the
QF and the Utility. This contract will remain in force until
either the QF or the Utility gives written notice to the other
that the contract is canceled. This contract will be canceled
30 days after notice is given.
This contract contains all the agreements made between the
QF and the Utility except that this contract shall at all times
be subject to all rules and orders issued by the Public Utilities
Commission or other government agency having jurisdiction
over the subject matter of this contract. The QF and the
Utility are not responsible for any agreements other than
those stated in this contract.

THE QF AND THE UTILITY HAVE READ THIS CONTRACT AND AGREE TO BE BOUND BY ITS TERMS. AS
EVIDENCE OF THEIR AGREEMENT, THEY HAVE EACH
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss2/5
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SIGNED THIS CONTRACT BELOW ON THE DATE WRITTEN AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS CONTRACT.

QF
By:

UTILITY
By:
(Title)
Note After Minnesota Proposed Rules Changes Suggested by
Hearing Examiner
The Administrative Law Judge conducting a hearing on the
proposed rules finds the current language of paragraph 5 of the
Uniform Contract too vague and broad in providing no limitation
on the content of the rules, regulations, and policies of the utility.
The ALJ recommends that paragraph 5 be redrafted to focus on
technical and operating specifications as follows:
The QF must operate its electric generating facilities within
any rules, regulations, and policies adopted by the utility not
prohibited by the Commission's rules on cogeneration and
small power production which provide reasonable technical
connection and operating specifications for the QF. This
Agreement does not waive the QF's right to bring a dispute
before the Commission as authorized by Minnesota Rules, part
7835.4800, part 7835.5800, part 7835.4500, and any other provision of the Commission's rules on cogeneration and Small
Power Production authorizing Commission resolution of a
dispute.*
*

Report of the Administrative Law Judge, Sept. 13, 1984, at 25.
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Appendix B
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
STANDARD OFFER #3
POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT
FOR
AS-DELIVERED CAPACITY AND ENERGY
FROM
FACILITIES OF 100 KILOWATTS OR LESS
MAY 1984
POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
AND
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
("Seller"), and PACIFIC GAS AND
ELECTRIC COMPANY ("PGandE"), referred to collectively as
"Parties" and individually as "Party", agree as follows:
1.

Seller states that its facility located at
and

described

as Make
, Serial No.

,
Model
., fuel or energy source

,and having a nameplate output rating of
kW,
volts,
phase, 60 hertz will
be ready to deliver power for sale on or about
_

2.

Seller has chosen to sell PGandE

-*

Seller has two options for payment for as-delivered capacity
and energy delivered to PGandE. They are:
Option No. 1: Seller elects to have the value of the
purchased power credited to its monthly
bill from PGandE for electric service in
the next billing period (assumes electric
service account).
Option No. 2: Seller elects to receive payment check
within approximately 30 days of the
meter reading date if the value of the
*

Insert either "not energy output" or "surplus energy output" to show the energy

sale option selected by Seller.
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purchased power is at least $50, and if
less, to have the value of the purchased
power credited to its monthly bill from
PGandE for electric service in the next
billing period.
Seller has selected Option No.

__

.

On and after the date PGandE gives its written approval for
parallel operation, PGandE shall pay Seller for as-delivered
capacity at prices authorized from time to time by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and which are
derived from PGandE's full avoided costs as approved by the
CPUC. PGandE shall pay Seller for energy at prices equal
to PGandE's full short run avoided operating costs as approved by the CPUC.
4. Seller shall pay for designing, installing, operating, and
maintaining the facility in accordance with all applicable
laws and regulations and shall comply with PGandE's electric Rule No. 21, which is attached hereto.
5. Seller shall deliver the as-delivered capacity and energy to
PGandE at the agreed point of delivery as shown in Appendix A.
6. PGandE shall, at its expense, furnish and install a standard
watt-hour meter (and current transformers if required) in a
meter socket and enclosure equipment provided and installed
by Seller at or near the point of delivery. At Seller's option
and expense, PGandE shall furnish and install a time-of-delivery meter pursuant to a separate special facilities agreement referred to in PGandE's electric Rule No. 21.
7. Seller shall (a) maintain the facility and interconnection facilities, except facilities installed by PGandE, in conformance
with all applicable laws and regulations, (b) obtain any governmental authorizations and permits required for the construction and operation thereof, and (c) maintain the facility
and interconnection facilities in a safe and prudent manner.
Seller shall reimburse PGandE for any and all losses, damages, claims, penalties, or liability it incurs as a result of
Seller's failure to obtain or maintain any governmental authorizations and permits required for construction and operation of Seller's facility.
8. (a) PGandE may enter Seller's premises (1) to inspect at
any reasonable times Seller's protective devices and read
or test meters, and (2) to disconnect, without notice, the
3.
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interconnection facilities if, in PGandE's opinion, a hazardous condition exists and such immediate action is
necessary to protect persons, or PGandE's facilities, or
other customers' facilities from damage or interference
caused by Seller's facility, or lack of properly operating
protective devices.
(b) PGandE shall not be obligated to accept or pay for and
may require Seller to interrupt or reduce deliveries of
as-delivered capacity and energy (1) when necessary in
order to construct, install, maintain, repair, replace, remove, investigate, or inspect any of its equipment or
part of its system, or (2) if it determines that curtailment, interruption, or reduction is necessary because of
emergencies, forced outages, force majeure, or compliance with prudent electrical practices.
(c) Whenever possible, PGandE shall give Seller reasonable
notice of the possibility that interruption or reduction of
deliveries may be required.
Each Party as indemnitor shall save harmless and indemnify
the other Party and the directors, officers, and employees of
such other Party against and from any and all loss and liability for injuries to persons including employees of either Party,
and damages, including property of either Party, resulting
from or arising out of (a) the engineering, design, construction, maintenance, or operation of or (b) the making of
replacements, additions, or betterments to the indemnitor's
facilities. This indemnity and save harmless provision shall
apply notwithstanding the active or passive negligence of the
indemnitee. Neither Party shall be indemnified for liability
or loss resulting from its sole negligence or willful misconduct. The indemnitor shall, on the other Party's request, defend any suit asserting a claim covered by this indemnity and
shall pay all costs, including reasonable attorney fees, that
may be incurred by the other Party in enforcing this
indemnity.
Nothing in this Agreement shall create any duty to, any standard of care with reference to, or any liability to any person
not a Party to it. Neither Party shall be liable to the other
Party for consequential damages.
Each Party shall be responsible for protecting its facilities
from possible damage by reason of the electrical disturbances
or faults caused by the operation, faulty operation, or non-
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operation of the other Party's facilities, and such other Party
shall not be liable for any such damages so caused.
This Agreement shall be in effect when signed by the Seller
and PGandE for an initial term of one year and shall remain
in effect thereafter month to month unless terminated by
either Party on 30 (thirty) days' advance written notice to the
other.
Any notice required under this Agreement shall be in writing
and mailed at any United States Post Office with postage
prepaid for transmission by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the Party, or personally delivered to the
Party, at the address below. Changes in such designation
may be made by notice similarly given.
All written notices shall be directed as follows:
to PGandE: Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Attention:
Manager,
Commercial
Department
77 Beale Street
San Francisco, CA 94106
to Seller:

14.

This Agreement includes the following appendix which is attached and incorporated by reference: Appendix A INTERCONNECTION.
15:
Insurance
15.1
General Liability Coverage
(a) Seller shall maintain during the performance hereof,
General Liability Insurance* of not less than $500,000 if
the nameplate rating of Seller's facility is over 20 kW to
100kW or $100,000 if the nameplate rating of Seller's facility is 20kW or below of combined single limit or
equivalent for bodily injury, personal injury, and property damage as the result of any one occurrence.
(b) General Liability Insurance shall include coverage for
Premises-Operations, Owners and Contractors Protective, Products/Completed Operations Hazard, Explosion, Collapse, Underground, Contractual Liability, and
*
Governmental agencies which have an established record of self-insurance may
provide the required coverage through self-insurance.
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Broad Form Property Damage including Completed
Operations.
(c) Such insurance, shall provide for 30-days' written notice
to PGandE prior to cancellation, termination, alteration,
or material change of such insurance.
Additional Insurance Provisions
15.2
(a) Evidence of coverage described above in Paragraph 15.1
shall state that coverage provided is primary and is not
excess to or contributing with any insurance or self-insurance maintained by PGandE.
(b) PGandE shall have the right to inspect or obtain a copy
of the original policy(ies) of insurance.
(c) Seller shall furnish the required certificates** and endorsements to PGandE prior to commencing operation.
(d) All insurance certificates**, endorsements, cancellations,
terminations, alterations, and material changes of such
insurance shall be issued and submitted to the following:
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
Attention: Manager - Insurance Department
77 Beale Street, Room E280
San Francisco, CA 94106
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties hereto have caused this
Agreement to be executed by their duly authorized representatives
as of the last date set forth below.
PACIFIC GAS AND

(SELLER)
BY:
(Type Name)
TITLE:
DATE SIGNED:

ELECTRIC COMPANY
BY:_
(Type Name)
TITLE:_
DATE SIGNED:

Mailing Address:

**

A governmental agency qualifying to maintain self-insurance should provide a

statement of self-insurance.
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Appendix C
Set forth below are suggestions for an Appendix to the uniform
statewide contract covering the technical requirements for the interconnection and operation of the small power facility under 100
kilowatts in capacity.' Smaller producers, by their nature, fit in
unobtrusively at scattered locations in a large utility grid. Practically speaking, they cannot cause the disturbances on the utility
systems that larger facilities can. Many of the technical requirements applicable to larger facilities, therefore, are not applicable
and are not included in these suggested technical requirements.
I. Applicable Electrical Safety Codes Affecting the
Interconnection
A. Installation of small power equipment and wiring to the
meter shall comply with the National Electric Safety
Code.
B. Installation of small power producer buildings, towers,
guy wires, and driveways shall comply with the necessary
clearance required by the National Electric Safety Code.
C. Installation of utility lines to the meter shall comply with
the National Electric Safety Code.
II. Required Automatic Disconnect Provisions
A. Utility and small power facility agree that automatic disconnect will occur if power is not supplied in compliance
with standard normal system voltages and voltage ranges
set forth in ANSI Table 1.2
B. Safety outages for which the automatic disconnect will be
solely relied on without the additional backup of manual
disconnect:

(this is only applicable

when a manual disconnect is not required in all situations by public utilities commission regulation).
C. Automatic safety disconnects shall be reconnected no less
than 30 minutes after the reasons for disconnect have
been alleviated.
III. Manual Disconnect Provisions (applicable only where the
public utilities commission has not required a manual disconnect in all situations).
1. These provisions are a synthesis of suggestions by the staff of the Minnesota Public Service Department and Jacobs Wind Electric Company.
2. AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE, AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT, app. B (1982).
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Safety Reasons
1. Manual disconnect shall be used zn addition to automatic disconnect for safety reasons under the following conditions:

2.

IV.

V.

Manual disconnect shall be used without automatic
disconnect under the following emergency conditions:
3. The utility shall give reasonable notice of a manual
disconnect to the small power producer.
4. The party who locks off shall reopen the disconnect.
B. Non-Safety Reasons
1. The manual disconnect shall be used for only the
following non-emergency conditions: (specify decisions of voltage, frequency, harmonics, power factor,
flicker, and non-emergency line service).
2. The utility shall give reasonable notice of a manual
disconnect to the small power producer.
3. The party who locks off shall reopen the disconnect.
C. Manual Reconnection After Manual Disconnection
1. The party who locks off shall reopen the disconnect
within 30 minutes after the reason for the disconnect has been alleviated.
D. Manual Disconnect Switch
1. The manual disconnect switch shall have adequate
physical and electrical features to ensure it is reasonably safe for line repair activities.
Inspections of Electrical Equipment Before Connection to
Utility Service
A. Electrical inspection shall be by state or local inspector
as provided in MINN. STAT. § 326.244.
B. Utility personnel shall inspect for compliance with installation plan submitted for utility approval to connect
and may inspect for conformance with National Electric
Safety Code.
Metering
A. Energy delivered to the QF and energy delivered to the
utility shall be measured on two different meters unless
the second meter is waived by the utility in net billing
situations.
B. Meter reading and billing shall be on the same basis and
frequency as billing to customers of the same class which
are not small power producers.
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VI.

Access to QF Premises
A. If under the terms of the uniform contract, the utility is
entitled to access to the premises, the premises to which
the utility shall have access are the immediate location
of the power generator together with associated connections, safety devices, and meters.
B. The utility shall have access in accordance with the
commission rules.
VII. Initial Costs of Installation
A. QF Equipment. Unless the second meter is waived by
the utility in net energy billing situations, two meters
shall be required: (i) the ordinary customer meter, at
no additional charge to the qualifying facility, shall be
used to read the net energy delivered to or from the
qualifying facility, and (ii) a detent meter to read the
quantity of power delivered by the qualifying facility
to the utility, which shall be installed by the qualifying
facility or at the expense of the qualifying facility at a
location on the premises accessible to both the qualifying facility owner and the utility. The detent meter
shall be in accordance with the specifications of the
utility reasonably established on the basis of the size,
type, and configuration of the qualifying facility.
B. The small power producer shall pay the cost of other
utility plant equipment solely required by the installation of the facility. The small producer shall own the
utility plant equipment for which it has paid the capital cost.
VIII. Contract Assignability
The contract is assignable if the assignee gives written notice of the assignment to the utility.
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